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 JURISDICTION 
 Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
 1. Did the trial court err in ruling that there is no historical or textual basis for 
interpreting the Utah Constitution differently than the federal constitution?  Interpretation of 
the Utah Constitution is a question of law reviewed for correctness.  Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 2003 UT 13, ¶ 17, 73 P.3d 325.  This issue was preserved in the Jensens’ opposition 
to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  (R. 1271.) 
 2. Did the trial court otherwise err in ruling that the federal court’s ruling was res 
judicata as to the Jensens’ state law claims?  Whether res judicata bars an action presents a 
question of law reviewed for correctness.  Mack v. Utah State Dept. of Comm., 2009 UT 47, 
¶ 26, --- P.3d ---.  This issue was preserved in the Jensens’ opposition to the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.  (R. 1271.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 1 – “All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to 
worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest 
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” 
 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7 – “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law.” 
 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 14 – “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized.” 
 
 1
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On July 18, 2005, the Jensens filed an action asserting violations of the Utah and 
United States constitutions, wrongful initiation of process, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  (R. 1-70.)  The defendants removed the action to federal court based 
upon the presence of the federal constitutional claims.  (R. 106-108.) 
 On September 22, 2008, U. S. District Court Judge Ted Stewart granted summary 
judgment to all remaining defendants on the federal constitutional claims.  (See Add. 
Exh. 3 (Memorandum Decision); see also R. 117-188.)  That ruling is currently on 
appeal. 
 The federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Jensens’ state law 
claims, stating that “as [the Jensens’] Utah constitutional claims present important 
questions of state law, the Court declines to further exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the state law claims and will remand them to the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from which this case was removed.”  Id., p. 62. 
 On remand, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment on varying 
grounds.  (R. 281, 947, 1012, 1089.)  The trial court granted summary judgment to all 
defendants on the grounds that the federal court’s dismissal of the federal claims was res 
judicata as to all of the Jensens’ state law claims.  (R. 4199; see Addendum Exhs. 1 and 
2.)  The Jensens timely appealed.  (R. 4211.) 
 2
 Statement of Facts1
The record includes the following evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom: 
 On April 30, 2003, Barbara Jensen of Sandy, Utah, took her son Parker to an oral 
surgeon to remove a small growth under Parker’s tongue that the family dentist had 
diagnosed as a clogged saliva duct ten months earlier.  (R. 2332-2334, 3278-79, 3283.) 
 The oral surgeon also diagnosed the growth as a clogged saliva duct, but sent a 
sample to LabCorp for testing per standard procedure.  (R. 1711-12, 3275-76.)  He 
subsequently received a call from a LabCorp doctor who said the sample was malignant, 
but he was “not sure of the cell type.”  (R. 1713-14, 3287.)  LabCorp later issued a report 
stating a diagnosis of “poorly differentiated small round blue cell tumor.”  (R. 3285-86.)  
That diagnosis could encompass up to 40 different tumor types, for which treatments 
vary.  (R. 1756, 2688-89, 2737, 2791, 3192.)  It is critical to make an accurate diagnosis 
of a patient’s cancer type, both for treatment and prognosis.  (R. 2738, 3199, 3210.) 
 The oral surgeon told the Jensens about the call, and said he had arranged for them 
to see an ear, nose & throat specialist (Dr. Muntz) at Primary Children’s Medical Center. 
 (R. 2334-35, 1715.)  Dr. Muntz noted that the tumor type was unknown, writing: “The 
unusual presentation and slow growth of this makes me less concerned re: 
rhabdomyosarcoma but such tumors as alveolar soft part sarcoma and leiomyosarcoma, 
etc are possibilities.”  (R. 2335, 3320.)  He referred the Jensens to the oncology 
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1 In the federal court, the defendants’ statements of fact totalled 194 pages; the Jensens 
submitted an additional 139 pages.  Accordingly, this summary is significantly truncated. 
A full chronology is at R. 1130-1270. 
 department, where they met with defendant Lars Wagner, an assistant professor of 
pediatrics at the University of Utah.  (R. 2336, 3147-48.)  Wagner said he couldn’t really 
do anything until he had his own facility’s pathology report.  (R. 2122, 3212-13.) 
 The pathologist on the case, Dr. Lowichik, began receiving unusually frequent 
phone calls from Wagner about Parker’s case.  (R. 2801-07.)  Lowichik was not prepared 
to state definitely that the tumor was Ewing’s, but she “did [her] best” to put it into a 
category.  (R. 2793-95.)  On May 20, 2003, she wrote that, from her examination, the 
results “suggest[ed] a diagnosis of Ewing’s Sarcoma.”  (R. 2793-94, 2804, 3352-53.) 
 A number of factors militated against a finding of Ewing’s, including: 
• Only about 1 percent of all cancers are pediatric, of which Ewing’s comprises 
only 3-5 percent.  (R. 3269-70.) 
 
• 80-90 percent of Ewing’s patients have primary tumors in the bone, not soft 
tissue, and of the latter, most are in the deep soft tissue.  (R. 2079-85, 3270.) 
Parker’s growth was in the superficial soft tissue.  (R. 2079-80, 2776, 3112.)  
Ewing’s in the mouth would be even rarer.  (R. 1520-21, 1790-91, 2078-79, 
2808, 3259.) 
 
• Ewing’s is aggressive and fast-growing; Parker’s was slow growing.  (R. 1516, 
1795, 2706-07, 3062, 3074, 3077.) 
 
 Lowichik’s May 20 report stated: “DIAGNOSIS: SOFT TISSUE UNDER TONGUE, 
BIOPSY; EWING SARCOMA / PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE NEUROECTODERMAL TUMOR (SEE 
COMMENT).”  (Ewing’s is often referred to as Primitive Neuroectodermal Tumor 
(“PNET”) when located in the soft tissue.  (R. 1521, 1751-52, 2047-48, 2092-2093.))  
The “Comment” said, “In the event of excision of additional lesional tissue from this site, 
cytogenetic studies and freezing of tissue for possible molecular ancillary studies may be 
informative.”  (R  3352-53.) 
 4
  The Jensens were informed that Parker had Ewing’s Sarcoma.  A “margin” 
(removal of remaining malignant tissue with a margin of clean cells) was scheduled, but 
later canceled.  (R. 2123-24, 2340, 2383-84.)  The Jensens were told that chemotherapy 
would begin the following Tuesday (R. 2125), and began preparing for the upcoming 
ordeal.  Barbara’s brother moved in from Idaho to tend the other children, and they 
planned structural changes to their house.  (R. 2125, 2296, 2307-08, 2611-12, 3278-79.) 
 Wagner said that Parker needed to begin chemotherapy immediately, that “we had 
two weeks because it was so aggressive.”  (R. 2166-67, 2340, 2415-16, 2650-51.)  The 
Jensens asked if there were any other tests that would help confirm the diagnosis of 
Ewing’s.  Wagner said no.  (R. 2150.)  That statement was false.  Wagner knew that: 
• Cytogenetic and molecular testing, which had not been done, were reliable 
diagnostic tests for Ewing’s (R. 1501-02, 3360), were routinely performed at 
PCMC in cases of suspected Ewing’s (R. 1500, 1758-60, 2730-33, 2798, 3167-68, 
3208, 3170, 3210-11), and were inexpensive. (R. 1792, 2799.)2 
 
• The only testing that had been done (immunohistochemical) cannot definitively 
diagnose Ewing’s, as markers indicative of Ewing’s can also manifest with other 
things, including healthy tissue.  (R. 1752, 2058, 2807, 3203-4, 3153, 3166.)  
Immunohistochemical testing also cannot detect an 11;22 translocation.  (R. 
2060.) 
 
 Wagner later testified that he declined to request genetic or molecular testing 
because it was not necessary and was not technically required by a Clinical Trial 
(AEWS0031) of which Wagner was a co-investigator.  (R. 3164-65, 3180.)  Although the 
                                                 
2 Cytogenetic/molecular testing looks for a chromosomal translocation in which a 
specific gene (FLI1) within chromosome 11 has moved to chromosome 22, and a specific 
gene (EWS) within chromosome 22 has moved to chromosome 11.  This “11;22 
translocation” is found in 85-95 percent of Ewing’s patients.  (R. 2668, 3207, 3374.) 
 5
 Clinical Trial says it “should NOT be used to direct the practice of medicine by any 
person or to provide individualized medical care, treatment, or advice to any patient or 
study subject” (emphasis in original), Wagner says that his handling of Parker’s case was 
pursuant to the AEWS0031 protocol.  (R. 3180-3184; Case No. 2:05-cv-00739, Doc. 18 
(Wagner Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, November 22, 2005, p. 15 ¶ 38).) 
 The AEWS0031 Clinical Trial was for patients with newly diagnosed Ewing’s 
that had not metastasized (spread).  (R. 3372.)  Very few patients present with newly 
diagnosed, localized Ewing’s.  (R. 1485, 2734-35, 2738, 3262.)  If Wagner wanted to 
enroll Parker in the AEWS0031 Trial, he had to do so within 30 days of the “diagnostic 
biopsy.”  (R. 0515, Ex. 65, p. 17.) Wagner calendared the date of biopsy as May 2.  (R. 
3378-79, 3382.)  However, a medical article cited by Wagner measured the deadline from 
the date of diagnosis, which would have been May 20.  (R. 3386.) 
 The AEWS0031 Trial “strongly recommended” molecular testing to confirm 
Ewing’s.  (R. 3375.)  Genetic/molecular testing was a reasonable request, and would have 
been performed had Wagner requested it.  (R. 1537-40, 2781-82, 2815.)  Defendant 
Albritton is unaware of anyone at PCMC ever refusing such testing.  (R. 1539-40.) 
 Wagner claims that a pathologist, Cheryl Coffin, told him that genetic/molecular 
testing was not necessary.  However, Coffin testified that she considers such testing 
“incredibly useful,” would not have been opposed if it had been requested, does not know 
why genetic/molecular testing was not done on Parker’s tissue, and is not aware of 
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 anyone who was opposed to such testing.  (R. 1774-75, 1770, 1793.) 
 Removing additional tissue from Parker’s mouth (an “oncologic” excision) to 
obtain a new sample would also have alleviated a concern of Albritton’s, which was that 
there were still tumor cells in Parker’s mouth.  Wagner falsely told Albritton that he had 
recommended an oncologic procedure to the Jensens.  (R. 1503-1506.)  However, when 
the Jensens asked about the originally scheduled margin, Wagner told them that, rather 
than removing the remaining tumor from Parker’s mouth immediately, a second surgery 
would not be performed until after twelve weeks of chemotherapy (which was a 
requirement of the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial protocol).  (R. 2135-36, 2353-54.) 
 The Jensens were confused.  They had read that the first thing to do with cancer is 
get all of the cancerous material out.  (R. 2645-46.)  Dr. Albritton testified that it is 
important to get all of the tumor out as soon as possible; she cannot think of any good 
reason to leave part of it in.  (R. 1528-29.) 
 Barbara Jensen again asked Wagner if there was any other test that would help 
confirm the diagnosis of Ewing’s, and he said no.  (R. 2154-55.)  At this point, all other 
tests (x-rays, CT and bone scans, blood tests, MRI) had come back normal.  (R. 0515 
(Ex. 12, pp. 49-61), 2131, 2376-78, 3275-76, 3278-79, 3318-20, 3325.) 
 Another of Barbara’s brothers referred the Jensens to a cancer specialist he knew 
in Oklahoma.  This doctor told the Jensens that the staging process for Ewing’s would 
include blood tests, x-rays, bone, CT, and PET scans, MRIs, and other tests like genetic 
tests.  (R. 2125-26, 2152-53, 2342-43, 2345, 2482, 2645-46.)  The Jensens told Wagner 
they wanted all the tests that this doctor mentioned and that they saw on the National 
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 Cancer Institute and other websites, which included genetic testing.  (R. 2361-62.) 
 Wagner now claims that he did not know that the Jensens were questioning the 
diagnosis, or he would have requested genetic/molecular testing.  (R. 3237-38.)  
However, on May 21, 2003, the Jensens had asked Wagner to send a “blind” sample to 
Harvard University for testing, which Wagner admits was because they had a question 
about the diagnosis.  (R. 2306, 2365-67, 3239.) 
 Wagner sent Parker’s slides to a pathologist at Harvard who was a fellow 
investigator for the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial (R. 3373, 3239).  Instead of the blind 
second opinion the Jensens requested, however, Wagner sent an e-mail denigrating their 
request for a second opinion, and urging the pathologist to agree with the “confident” 
diagnosis by his “expert” pathologist as quickly as possible.  He alerted his co-
investigator that “the child was now 19 days post resection.”  (R. 3427-28.)  Wagner also 
said that he did not want to “slow things down” by submitting a claim to the Jensens’ 
insurer, and that the Jensens had agreed to pay for the testing personally.  (R. 3428.) 
 Upon learning that Wagner had not honored their request for a blind second 
opinion, the Jensens decided to have the testing performed elsewhere.  They did not have 
confidence that Wagner would obtain a truly independent opinion.  (R. 2370-71, 2626.)  
The Jensens had believed the initial testing, but were starting to wonder both about the 
diagnosis and Wagner’s insistence on immediate chemotherapy.  Some red flags: 
• The Jensens could find no reported cases of Ewing’s in the mouth (R. 2164); 
 
• The survival rates quoted by Wagner kept changing as he urged them to start 
chemotherapy (70, then 85, then 90 percent) (R. 2239-40, 2356, 2392-93, 2605-
06), and Wagner seemed irritated by legitimate questions, such as why Parker 
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 would need 45 weeks of chemotherapy if another biopsy at twelve weeks came 
back negative (R. 2357-58); 
 
• Wagner had given them the names of the chemotherapy drugs that would be used 
by writing them on a napkin (R. 2400); 
 
• A margin had been scheduled and then canceled, which seemed inconsistent with 
application of a standard procedure (R. 2124); 
 
• Leaving a deadly tumor in Parker’s mouth for another three months seemed 
counterintuitive (R. 2645-46); 
 
• Wagner insisted that Parker must be experiencing eating and sleeping difficulties 
and losing weight, which the Jensens told him was not happening (R. 2378-79); 
 
• The Jensens asked Wagner about Lowichik’s comment that “cytogenetic” testing 
might be informative, but Wagner said it was unnecessary and did not explain why 
(R. 2372-75, 2395-96). 
 
 On May 28, 2003, the Jensens consulted with Dr. Judith Moore, a family doctor at 
the Modern Health Clinic in Bountiful that had successfully treated Barbara’s father for 
prostate cancer.  (R. 2225-26.)  The Jensens told Moore that, if they had an objective 
confirmation of Parker’s diagnosis, they would agree to chemotherapy.  (R. 2960-61.)  
From Parker’s records and the length of time involved, Moore told the Jensens that she 
was not convinced that Parker had Ewing’s.  (R. 1695, 2486, 2952-56, 2961.) 
 The Clinic’s treatment of Barbara’s father had been with a form of chemotherapy 
called Insulin Potentiation Therapy (IPT).  (R. 2165, 2225-26.)  The Jensens asked 
whether IPT might be a potential treatment if Parker had Ewing’s, and requested 
information to take to their oncologist.  (R. 1691, 1693-94, 1700-01.)  At a May 29, 
2003, meeting, the Jensens asked Wagner to “look into” IPT.  (R. 2139-41, 3395.) 
 At the meeting, Barbara said, “There’s got to be another test that can narrow it 
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 down more than just maybe or invisible.”  Wagner said there was not.  (R. 2150, 2183-
85.)  Moore had recommended a PET scan, which Wagner admits are positive in most 
patients with Ewing’s, but Wagner refused the request.  (R. 2380-81, 2947-48, 3218-20.)3
 Daren expressed concern that treatment would not be effective unless the cancer 
were definitively identified, and said it seemed odd that the exact same treatment would 
be given to Parker as to someone with a large tumor in his leg.  (R. 3395.)  Daren’s 
instincts were correct.  Several years earlier, superficial soft tissue Ewing’s had been 
identified as a prognostically favorable subset in which chemotherapy is not always 
administered.  (R. 2080-83.)  Parker’s growth was superficial and in the squamous 
epithelium (the tissue beneath the tongue, essentially a form of skin).  (R. 2049-50, 2063-
65.) 
 Since the LabCorp and PCMC reports did not state the same diagnosis, the 
Jensens asked Wagner to test another sample from Parker’s mouth, but Wagner refused.  
(R. 2401-02.)  His response “floored” the Jensens, who thought, “why wouldn’t you do 
additional testing, even if it was just as a safety point[?]”  (R. 2577-78.)  Daren explained 
that he was “just trying to get enough information so I can determine how to proceed 
with Parker.”  Wagner interrupted, “You don’t have the decision on how we treat Parker. 
 You can be a part of the decision.”  (R. 2402-03.) 
 Wagner told pathologist Lowichik that the Jensens had given him an article about 
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3 Moore then prescribed the PET scan, the results of which were normal.  (R. 2947-48, 
3525.)  The PET scan did not show cancer in Parker’s mouth, where the cancer cells 
supposedly were located.  (R. 2965-66.) 
 IPT in which a Ewing’s patient had gotten better.  Rather than show her the article, 
Wagner told her that the article was quite old and that immunohistochemistry had not 
been performed.  He asked Lowichik to speculate, without reading it, on whether the 
patient in the article might not have had Ewing’s.  (R. 2801.) 
 On June 2, 2003, a social worker working with Wagner called defendant Kari 
Cunningham, a DCFS case worker, with a “heads up” that DCFS might become 
involved.  (R. 1873.)  On June 5, Wagner called Daren, who was out of town, and 
demanded that he come in.  Wagner said that if he did not, Wagner would “take his 
child” in “three days.”  (R. 2405-06.)  A meeting was scheduled for June 9.  (R. 0515 
(Ex. 15, p. 20); 2410-11.) 
 At the meeting, the Jensens again asked if a new sample could be taken and tested, 
but the request was refused.  (R. 2417, 2422-23.)  According to Wagner’s notes, the 
Jensens were asked about their plans regarding IPT, and “[f]ather indicated that he was 
still reviewing this information.”  (R. 2644, 3408.)  The Jensens complained that PCMC 
was jumping into treatment when they were still asking about the diagnosis.  (R. 2161.) 
 A PCMC risk management employee in attendance then “leaned forward in her 
chair like she was picking up a card off the table and showed it to us like this.”  She said 
she didn’t want to, but “I have a card to play.”  She said she could report the Jensens to 
DCFS and “have your child in three days.”  The Jensens replied, “We’re going to go find 
another hospital that will work with us.  You’re fired.”  (R. 2156-57, 2162, 2412.) 
 On June 12, Wagner went to DCFS liaison Dr. David Corwin, reporting, “patient 
with Ewing’s sarcoma; family refusing conventional therapy and seeking unproven 
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 alternative treatment methods.”  (R. 3378-79, 3396, 1810-11.)  Wagner did not disclose 
that the Jensens were seeking confirmation of Parker’s diagnosis.  Id. 
 Dr. Corwin called Daren Jensen, who expressed concern about Wagner’s refusal 
to run additional tests before starting chemotherapy.  Daren stated that the Jensens had 
not decided that IPT was a solution for Parker, and mentioned that they were planning a 
margin to remove the surrounding tissue.  (R. 1815, 1825, 2426-28, 2639.) 
 Daren agreed to another meeting.  Dr. Corwin said he was going out of town for a 
few days, so a meeting was set for his return on Friday, which meeting it was believed 
Dr. Moore might attend.  Corwin knew that the Jensens had confidence in Moore.  (R. 
1823-24, 1829, 1833, 2429, 2440.)  Corwin told Wagner about the meeting, but Wagner 
said they could not wait that long.  Corwin asked, “How much difference does a few days 
make?” but Wagner said it was “urgent.”  (R. 1824-1830.)  Corwin told Wagner that the 
Jensens were planning another resection of the tumor, which made sense to Corwin, but 
Wagner said no, it should be left in.  (R. 1826-27.)  Corwin assumed that, if other 
diagnostic tests were available that had not been run, Wagner would have told him.  (R. 
1819-1820.)  At Wagner’s insistence, Corwin called Daren Jensen and canceled the 
meeting, stating that the Jensens would be reported to DCFS instead.  (R. 2429.) 
 Meanwhile, Wagner falsely told his supervisor that he had provided all 
information he could to the family regarding the diagnosis, and that the Jensens had not 
given him any material on IPT.  (R. 2754-55, 2760.)  Wagner further said that Daren 
Jensen had canceled the meeting, and that “there were no further opportunities to meet 
with the Jensens[.]”  (R. 2758-59, 2763, 2765.)  Wagner also claimed to have discussed 
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 numerous other things with the Jensens that he had not.  (R. 2743-48, 2751-53.) 
 At a June 16, 2003, meeting, Wagner presented a “case summary” to DCFS that 
contained several material misrepresentations and omissions, including: 
• that the May 20 biopsy results “confirmed” Ewing’s, when Wagner knew that 
immunohistochemical staining cannot definitively diagnose Ewing’s; 
 
• that “[t]he Jensens requested a second opinion of the sample from Dana Farber 
Clinic at Harvard University.  Dr. Wagner agreed to this, and the sample was sent 
to Boston,” omitting that the sample was never tested at Dana-Farber, that he had 
denied a blind test, and that he had attempted to influence the outcome of the test; 
 
• that “On May 21, 2003, Parker underwent a CT and bone scan,” omitting that the 
results were normal; 
 
• that “On May 29, 2003, Mr. and Ms. Jensen told Dr. Wagner that they wanted to 
use Insulin Potentiation Therapy as an alternative to chemotherapy,” which was 
contrary to PCMC’s own notes that the parents only asked Wagner to “look into” 
IPT, and also that “IPT therapy was listed on a website called Quackwatch,” 
which he knew was untrue (R. 3395, 3398); 
 
• that at the June 9 meeting, Wagner “asked the family if any more information 
would be helpful.  The family declined.” when the Jensens had in fact asked for 
testing of a new sample and been refused; 
 
• that the Jensens had refused to meet again, when it was Wagner who refused. 
 Based upon Wagner’s report, a referral was made to DCFS on June 16, 2003, and 
assigned to defendant Kari Cunningham, whose office was in a hallway at PCMC.  (R. 
1887-90, 2763-64, 3411).  Cunningham did not want to be a social worker, and did not 
like doing investigations.  (R. 1852, 1857-59.)  She considered her workload too high, 
and the first thing she did with the Jensen case was unsuccessfully try to get another 
DCFS office to handle it.  (R. 1859-60, 1865-68, 1899-1900.) 
 Cunningham knew that it was her duty to investigate Wagner’s allegation of 
 13
 medical neglect, and that the office of the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) would rely in part 
on her investigation.  (R. 1557-58, 1560-61, 1862-64, 1869, 1960-62.)  Instead, she 
simply assumed Wagner’s allegations to be true and performed no investigation at all.  
(R. 1875-76, 1891, 1893-97, 1906-09, 1922-1927.)  Although state law required 
Cunningham to contact the alleged victim’s parents (R. 3431), she decided not to contact 
the Jensens, and instead to get their side of the story entirely from the person who was 
reporting them.  (R. 1903-05)  Cunningham took the position that, if a doctor’s complaint 
seemed reasonable to her, she would not investigate it.  She never once ran a medical 
neglect allegation past another doctor.  (R. 1863, 1870-71, 1874-75.) 
 Cunningham never contacted Dr. Moore or considered letting the Jensens rely on 
her recommendations because Wagner said that Moore was not qualified to treat Parker.  
(R. 1883-84, 1913-14.)  Wagner said it was an emergency, and that Cunningham needed 
to do something within days.  (R. 1879-80.)  He did not disclose that Parker’s parents 
were questioning the diagnosis and had requested additional diagnostic tests, which 
Cunningham would have considered important.  (R. 1879, 1881.)  Wagner gave 
Cunningham the impression that he had done everything he could do diagnostically; he 
never mentioned the availability of genetic or molecular testing.  (R. 1904-05, 1910-11.) 
 On June 17, 2003, Cunningham signed under oath a Verified Petition and Motion 
to Transfer Custody and Guardianship.  (R. 3435-39.)  The verified petition contained 
several factual misrepresentations, e.g., that the Jensens had “indicated their intent to use 
IPT” when the Jensens had said they were reviewing the possibility; that “Dr. David 
Corwin was consulted for an independent assessment,” when Cunningham knew that 
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 Corwin was a psychiatrist consulted in connection with reporting the Jensens to DCFS, 
not for an “independent assessment” of Parker’s medical condition; and that “the father 
[Daren]” canceled the Friday meeting, when it was Wagner.  (R. 3435-39.)  The petition 
also omitted material facts, including that she had not conducted any investigation; that 
the parents were questioning the diagnosis, that confirmatory tests had not been run, and 
that, if Parker did have Ewing’s, it was a very unusual form.  (R. 3435-39.) 
 DCFS filed a Motion for Expedited Hearing, specifying a hearing date of June 20, 
2003.  (R. 0515 (Ex. 10, pp. 0007-16).)  The filings were dated June 17, but were not 
filed or served until June 18, id., so the “three days” Wagner had touted turned out to be 
two.4
 At about this time, Wagner e-mailed Cunningham a page from Principles and 
Practice of Pediatric Oncology by Pizzo and Poplack, “the primary pediatric solid tumor 
textbook,” that discussed chemotherapy.  (R. 2687, 2741-42, 3188-90.)  Wagner omitted 
pages that said that “molecular diagnosis has become the gold standard” for diagnosing 
Ewing’s, that an 11;22 translocation was definitive, and that repeatedly emphasized the 
superiority of genetic/molecular  testing to confirm a Ewing’s diagnosis.  (R. 3358-63.) 
 Meanwhile, the Jensens scrambled to find an attorney.  (R. 2329a-30.)  Eventually, 
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4 The timing of the two-day hearing might not be coincidental.  If the enrollment deadline 
were measured from the date of diagnosis, as in the New England Journal of Medicine 
article, Day 30 would have been June 20, 2003, which might explain why Wagner told 
Corwin he could not wait three days to meet with the Jensens on June 20 even though 
Corwin wanted to; why the DCFS filings were backdated so that the “three day” hearing 
could be held on June 20; and why Wagner told Cunningham at the June 16 staffing that 
Parker could be dead in “five days.” 
 they found Frank Mylar, a former Assistant A.G. who had served as general counsel to 
the Utah Department of Health and to the Department of Corrections.  (R. 3505-06.) 
 A friend told the Jensens that he had a connection with a cancer specialist in 
Vienna, Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer, whose resume said he had received a medical degree from 
the University of Munich, served as a visiting research fellow at several American 
universities and head of the Division of Tumor Oncology at the University of Munich, 
and was a member of the American Association of Cancer Research.  (R. 3366.) 
 The Jensens faxed Parker’s medical records to Dr. Birkmayer, who told them he 
questioned whether Parker had cancer.  (R. 2170-71, 2485.)  Birkmayer agreed to 
perform an independent evaluation, including new tests on the slides.  (R. 2603-04.)  
Anticipating the consultation, the Jensens applied for a passport for Parker.  (R. 3278-79, 
3678.) 
 The Jensens also called the oral surgeon’s office to schedule the margin.  (R. 
2434.)  The surgeon immediately called Dr. Muntz, who said he did not object to 
repeating a biopsy.  Muntz said that the Jensens were refusing chemotherapy, and asked 
the surgeon to encourage them to begin treatment.  (R. 1717-19, 1721, 3288.) 
 The oral surgeon understood that the Jensens wanted “an objective second 
opinion,” which seemed reasonable to him.  (R. 1735-36, 1718.)  However, instead of 
honoring the Jensens’ request for a blind second opinion, he called a close friend 
pathologist at the University of Washington, who agreed to “help out.”  (R. 1705-06, 
1724, 1740-44, 2117-18.)  The surgeon mailed the new sample to his friend, underlining 
“Ewing’s” as a reminder.  (R. 1729, 3585.) 
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  Upon receiving the sample, the surgeon’s friend called LabCorp to get their earlier 
results, ran a few tests that are facially inadequate to diagnose Ewing’s, got a copy of Dr. 
Lowichik’s report, wrote a report stating that a finding of a non-specific antigen (CD 99) 
“supported” the diagnosis (omitting the results of one key test that apparently turned out 
negative), signed her name and the name of another pathologist who had no involvement, 
and sent the report to the surgeon.  (R. 0515 (Ex. 38), 2066-2070, 2075, 3291-93.)5
 On June 19, the Jensens and their attorney consulted a doctor at LDS Hospital 
who told them that “he found no present evidence of Ewing’s Sarcoma or any other 
cancer but that he was uncomfortable second-guessing the doctors at Primary.”  (R. 2494-
95, 3508-09.)  He predicted that the second pathology review might change the diagnosis, 
but that it would still be in the same “category” as Ewing’s.  (R. 3073-74.) 
 The Jensens appeared in juvenile court the next day.  Representing DCFS was 
defendant Assistant A.G. Susan Eisenman (R. 1962-64), who assumed that Cunningham 
had performed the statutorily prescribed investigation.  (R. 1960-62, 2030.)  At the June 
20 hearing, Mylar indicated that the Jensens were obtaining “further tests on the actual 
sample” (R. 0515, Ex. 33a, pp. 5-6).  The juvenile court continued the case until July 10 
in the hope that the parties would reach a resolution.  (R. 3454-55.) 
 On June 23, 2003, Dr. Birkmayer sent Eisenman a letter stating that he had 
                                                 
5 The UW pathologist later received a request from a hospital for the second sample, but 
did not release it.  That same day, she removed the uninvolved doctor’s name from her 
report.  (R. 3084-85, 3099-3100, 3602-04.)  A later effort by a Boise doctor to get the 
second sample from this pathologist also proved unfruitful.  (R. 2713.) 
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 reviewed Parker’s records and would be assuming care of Parker, giving a brief overview 
of his credentials and experience.  (R. 3529.)  Eisenman knew that Birkmayer’s letter 
raised doubt about the diagnosis, and that the Jensens wanted confirmation of the 
diagnosis before beginning treatment.  (R. 1994, 3459, 3506, 3509-10.) 
 On June 25, 2003, Daren called the oral surgeon to ask about the test results from 
UW.  During the call, Christensen admitted that he had told the UW pathologist about the 
prior diagnosis, which frustrated Daren and Barbara.  (R. 1740, 2119.) 
 Upon reviewing the UW report, Dr. Birkmayer told the Jensens, “What is going 
on over there?  CD 99 is not definitive of Ewing’s Sarcoma.”  (R. 2116, 2450, 2633.)  Dr. 
Moore likewise reaffirmed her doubt as to whether Parker had Ewing’s.  (R. 2633, 2944-
46, 2957-59, 2962.)  However, Moore indicated that she was not interested in getting 
involved in a court case.  (R. 2144-45, 2221-23, 2620-23, 2556-57.) 
 On July 2, 2003, defendant Eisenman e-mailed Dr. Birkmayer, inquiring whether 
the Jensens were planning on traveling to Vienna, asking for the name of doctors with 
whom he usually consulted in the United States, and asking if he was certified to practice 
in the United States.  Eisenman cited some studies associated with his clinic that she had 
found on the internet and asked if he intended to employ the same treatment for Parker.  
She stated that the American Academy of Pediatrics had established a standard of care for 
pediatric cancer patients in the United States, asked whether there was something similar 
in Austria, and requested a copy.  She asked Birkmayer for information concerning his 
clinical experience and experience with child patients.  (R. 1990, 3535.) 
 Eisenman knew that the AAP guidelines, which did not come from Wagner or the 
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 guardian ad litem (GAL), actually said that they were intended to suggest “state-of-the-
art” care, and “do not indicate an exclusive course of treatment or serve as a standard of 
medical care.”  (R. 1982-83, 1991, 3231-33.) 
 In another letter dated July 9, Dr. Birkmayer said he was not convinced from the 
pathology reports that Parker had Ewing’s, citing the lack of definitive testing, the slow 
growth rate, and the location, and suggesting “more precise testing of the tissue prior to 
proceeding with a 45-week chemotherapy regimen.”  (R. 3479-80.) 
 Eisenman recognized that Dr. Birkmayer had “questioned the diagnosis of Ewing's 
sarcoma.” (R. 3546-47.)  However, she told Mylar that she would not allow the Jensens 
to use Birkmayer because he was not licensed in the United States.  (R. 2455-56, 3507.)  
Eisenman knew that the State could not legally prohibit parents from taking their child to 
another country for medical treatment.  (R. 1987-89.) 
 Eisenman also began insisting to the Jensens’ counsel that only a “board-certified 
pediatric oncologist” was qualified to treat Parker, and therefore she would not permit the 
Jensens to use any physician who was not so certified.  (R. 3002-05, 3008-09, 3507-08, 
3029-31.)  Eisenman knew that the law did not require the Jensens to use a board-
certified pediatric oncologist (R. 1992, 2016).  She also knew that Wagner – the doctor 
who had reported the Jensens in the first place – was not a board-certified pediatric 
oncologist.  (R. 1980-81.)  (Neither was the head of pediatric oncology at PCMC.  (R. 
2728.)) 
 Trying to find a pediatric oncologist that DCFS would accept, Nakamura called a 
pediatric radiologist he knew at the Children’s Hospital of Los Angeles (CHLA).  The 
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 radiologist said that Ewing’s in oral tissue would be highly unusual, and it would be 
prudent to do additional testing to confirm that it was Ewing’s.  (R. 2972-75, 2983-84.) 
 On July 10, 2003, the Jensens went back to juvenile court for a pre-trial 
conference.  A stipulation was reached in which a Dr. Tishler at CHLA would conduct 
independent testing, and then make recommendations.  (R. 2911-12, 3555.)6
 After the conference, Eisenman e-mailed Cunningham that “I view today’s 
hearing as a pretty strong indication from the Judge that he is not going to allow us to 
intervene with this family.”  (R. 1997, 3403.)  Eisenman had an emotional tie to the case, 
telling Nakamura that she had had a personal situation in her family and she knew that 
the Jensens were just in denial.  (R. 2993-96.)  Eisenman knew, but never disclosed to the 
court, that genetic testing was usually done in Ewing’s cases, and that other tests were 
available to confirm Parker’s diagnosis.  She admits that “the court might have been 
interested in that.”  (R. 1011 (Ex. 2, pp. 137-138).) 
 The Jensens arrived at CHLA on July 21, 2003.  (R. 3603-04.)  Dr. Tishler had not 
reviewed Parker’s records, and left the room during the meeting to see whether the 
samples had arrived yet.  He said that no, he had not seen anything yet, which the Jensens 
assumed meant that the tissue was not there yet.  (R. 2120-21, 2302, 2608-09.) 
 Tishler admits that he indicated at this meeting that Parker needed chemotherapy 
based solely on the earlier pathology reports, not on evaluations by his own institution.  
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6 Nakamura advised the court of one problem that could affect the testing:  PCMC had 
lost Parker’s tissue.  (R. 3545.)  The samples were missing for nearly two weeks until 
“eventually” they were found.  (R. 1784, 1974-75, 2813, 2881-82, 3512.) 
 He said that PCMC was a good hospital and he would be inclined to defer to it, even 
though he had not read all the documents yet.  (R. 2193, 2232, 2464-66, 3088-89, 3098-
99.)  The Jensens were dismayed.  They understood that the July 10 stipulation required a 
fresh evaluation, not a deferral to PCMC.  (R. 2234, 2499-2500.)  Their attorney and the 
GAL had the same understanding.  (R. 2885-86, 2911-12, 3015-16.) 
 Although Tishler said he already had a recommendation based on PCMC’s 
reports, he said he would have molecular testing done on Parker’s tissue.  (R. 3088-89, 
3094-95, 3113.)  Eisenman, meanwhile, was moving forward with removing Parker from 
his parents’ custody.  Even before the Jensens arrived in Los Angeles, she had drafted a 
warrant to take custody.  (R. 3412.)  Defendant Wagner (who had moved to Ohio) signed 
a July 22, 2003, affidavit for that purpose, repeating the misrepresentations and omissions 
from his earlier reports to Corwin and DCFS.  (R. 3156-57, 3607-09, see p. 12-13, 
supra.)  
 Because Tishler had already expressed an inclination to defer to PCMC, Daren 
called another doctor to whom they had been referred, Dr. Charles B. Simone.  (R. 2456-
57, 2502.)  From Simone’s website, the Jensens concluded that he had served as a 
medical oncologist and tumor immunologist at the National Cancer Institute, helped 
organize the Office of Alternative Medicine of the National Institutes of Health, and had 
authored several books about cancer.  (R. 3339-43.) 
 Simone said he would accept Parker in his care.  He said that chemotherapy was a 
possibility, but that until he performed a full examination, he could not recommend a 
treatment.  (R. 2190-02, 2461, 2504-05, 2617.)  From Lowichik’s original report, Simone 
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 questioned whether Parker might have lymphoma, and recommended that the sample be 
sent to an expert at the National Cancer Institute.  (R. 2507, 3063-64, 3612-13.) 
 On July 24, 2003, Tishler at CHLA sent Daren Jensen an e-mail stating, “I have 
asked Dr. Gonzales to perform the specific genetic testing we discussed on Tuesday.  
After we complete testing here we can release the tissue block to an outside consultant, 
either our colleagues or an institution of your selection.”  (R. 3617.) 
 The day before a July 28, 2003, court conference, Dr. Simone told the Jensens and 
Nakamura that he was not willing to become involved in a court battle.  (R. 2188-89, 
2618-19.)  Before court the next day, the Jensens gave Simone’s information to 
Eisenman.  Because Simone only ruled out acting as Parker’s primary physician if he 
were dragged into a court battle, the Jensens hoped that Eisenman would allow him as 
their physician because he was an oncologist.  (R. 2246.) 
 In the July 28 conference, Tishler was conferenced in by phone.  (R. 3103-04.)  
He said that CHLA’s testing was “being done right now,” and that it would be completed 
after the tissue blocks came back from NCI.  (R. 3558.)  Tishler had not seen any 
pathology report from his institution, and knew that the lab was still working on the 
genetic studies.  (R. 3104.)  He stated, “We will be doing the comprehensive testing and 
[treatment] is to occur when we are finished.”  He estimated he would have the test 
results and be prepared to make a final recommendation in ten days.  He confirmed that 
he would not be issuing a final recommendation until he had those test results.  (R. 0515 
(Ex. 33c, pp. 23-24), 3481-82, 3560-62.)  Based upon the prediction that CHLA’s results 
and recommendations would be in within ten days, the juvenile court directed that 
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 chemotherapy was to begin by August 8.  Id. 
 When asked whether she could team up with Dr. Simone, defendant Albritton 
(Wagner’s replacement in the case) stated, “My understanding of the fact is that he is not 
board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical oncology.”  (R. 0515, Ex 33c, pp. 
50-51.)  At that time, Albritton knew, and did not disclose, that defendant Wagner was 
not a board-certified pediatric oncologist.  (R. 1488, 1512, 1980-1981, 3246, 3263-65.)  
Cunningham testified that, had she known that Wagner was not a board-certified 
pediatric oncologist, she would have brought it to the court’s attention at that time.  (R. 
1924-25, 1931.)  The court said that Simone could not be Parker’s primary physician.  
(R. 3562.) 
 The juvenile court indicated that CHLA’s test results would be dispositive (R. 
3481-82), and set an evidentiary hearing for August 20 on DCFS’s petition for custody.  
(R. 2896, 2986-87, 3481-83.) 
 Tishler never notified anyone that the CHLA testing was complete.  Between July 
28 and August 8, the GAL called and e-mailed Tishler directly, but Tishler did not report 
any test results to her.  (R. 2862-63, 2883-84, 2887-88, 3101-02.)  On August 4, 2003, 
Dr. Tishler sent Eisenman an e-mail, which did not mention any results.  (R. 3101, 3616.) 
 Daren contacted CHLA several times to ask about test results, with no success.  (R. 
2516, 2607-08.)  The Jensens never went back because “they never got back to us and 
told us that they had done the test and that he had [Ewing’s].”  (R. 2178, 3105.) 
 On July 31, 2003, the National Cancer Institute doctor expert issued a report that 
said in part:  “The site of presentation would be very unusual for PNET.  Furthermore, 
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 FLI-1 protein expression is not specific as vascular tumors can also be positive.  
Molecular studies for the 11;22 translocation are being performed at Children's Hospital, 
and should be helpful in precise classification.  However, the histological and 
immunophenotypic features are not those of lymphoma.”  (R. 3623.) 
 Because Simone as a primary care physician was no longer an option and CHLA 
had already indicated an inclination to defer to PCMC, the Jensens continued to look for 
someone who would perform the independent evaluation they wanted.  (R. 2508, 2193.)  
They saw a story about a boy with a blastoma whose parents wanted to go to the 
Burzynski Clinic in Houston.  (R. 2197.)  From its website, it appeared that the Clinic 
had been studying and treating cancer since 1977, that its staff included a physician who 
was board-certified in internal medicine and hematology, and that it “work[ed] with other 
nearby medical providers to offer complete treatment for patients.”  (R. 3334, 3336-37.) 
 Daren called the Clinic to ask if it had a board-certified pediatric oncologist, and 
was told yes.  (R. 2204-05, 2480-81, 3129.)  (Nakamura was also informed that the Clinic 
had a qualified physician on staff who treated cancer (R. 2981-82.)  PNET was on the 
list of diseases that the Clinic treated (R. 3134-38).  The Jensens faxed Parker’s records 
to the Clinic (R. 2196), and an appointment was made to admit Parker for an evaluation 
to begin August 12.  (R. 2202, 2247-2248, 2264, 2648, 2658-59.) 
The Jensens believed that, if Parker was not in chemotherapy by August 8, they 
would be permitted to explain why at the August 20 hearing.  (R. 2194-95, 2259, 2288-
89, 2466-67, 2508-11, 2515, 2521-22, 2543.)  The Jensens’ attorney considered that a 
reasonable belief in light of the proceedings to date.  (R. 2986-87.)  The Jensens, their 
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 attorney, and the GAL all understood that, under the stipulation, the Jensens were not 
required to submit Parker to chemotherapy until an independent diagnosis had been 
rendered by CHLA based on the results of its testing (R. 2549-50, 2885-86, 2911-12, 
3015-16), which had not been issued yet. 
 In anticipation of the upcoming tests in Houston, Parker suggested a get-together 
with extended family members, and a friend volunteered his cabin on the Idaho side of 
Bear Lake.  (R. 2268-2270, 2521, 2567.)  On the morning of August 8, the Jensens left 
with their children and boat for the cabin, where they met other relatives.  They planned 
to leave their other children with Barbara’s parents in Idaho and leave for the Clinic in 
Houston on Sunday.  (R. 2269-72, 2275, 2518-19, 2526, 2533, 2567.) 
 Although Eisenman knew that the controlling test results from CHLA were not in 
yet, she proceeded with her plan to transfer custody of Parker.  At 1 p.m. on August 8, 
she called a police officer, Travis Peterson, with whom she was acquainted and told him 
she would need help removing a child.  (R. 1943-44, 2020-21, 3641.) 
 Defendant Cunningham signed an affidavit that she admits presented only the 
State’s side of the story and contained misleading information.  (R. 1937, 3440-46.)  For 
example, Cunningham admits that she knew by then that testing had not been conducted 
at Harvard, that Parker’s CT and bone scans were normal, and that the Jensens were not 
pursuing IPT, all of which was contrary to statements in her affidavit.  She never spoke 
with a pathologist, as her affidavit claimed.  She said the Jensens had consulted “a man” 
in Vienna, rather than naming Birkmayer or identifying him as a doctor.  (R. 1935-40.)  
She claimed that Tishler had said “Parker should commence chemotherapy,” when she 
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 knew he had actually said that he would not be making final treatment recommendations 
until all of the testing was in, including genetic testing.  See p. 22, supra.)7
 Eisenman and Cunningham took an order and warrant down to court, where an 
off-the-record hearing occurred in chambers.  (R. 2861, 3481-83.)  The Jensens’ attorney, 
Nakamura, was contacted by telephone, and told the court about the Jensens’ 
arrangements with the Burzynski Clinic.  (R. 2011, 2024.) 
 Cunningham paged defendant Albritton, who represented that Burzynski was 
“NOT a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his clinic is well known for 
providing extremely controversial therapy.”  (R. 1943, 2024-25) (emphasis in original).)  
Albritton did not disclose that another doctor at the clinic was board-certified.  She also 
represented that the Clinic was only conducting clinical trials of nonapproved FDA 
treatments of cancer not involving chemotherapy (R. 2012, 2863-64, 3032-34), which 
was untrue.  The Clinic offered chemotherapy, and FDA trials were only one of its 
departments.  (R. 3121-22, 3125, 3132-34.) 
 No one informed the court that the CHLA test results were not in yet.  (R. 2863.)  
The judge signed Eisenman’s order and warrant transferring custody of Parker to the 
State.  (R. 2013, 2027, 3485-86.)  Cunningham then went to the Jensens’ house to 
execute the warrant.  A neighbor said she thought they had gone water skiing, as they had 
taken their boat with them, and a note appeared to have had been left by another 
                                                 
7 Cunningham submitted another affidavit on August 18 to continue the custody warrant 
that repeated these misrepresentations.  (R. 3440-46.) 
 26
 
 neighbor.  It was evident that the Jensens “had been gone all day.”  (R. 2866-68, 3642.) 
 At about 6 p.m., Daren was informed by Nakamura that a “pickup order” had been 
issued, and that Parker was to be placed in DCFS custody to start chemotherapy.  (R. 
2273, 2529.)  After consulting with an attorney in Idaho, the Jensens concluded that the 
best action would be to get the evaluation and then bring Parker back for the August 20 
evidentiary hearing.  Otherwise, the State would take him and begin chemotherapy, and 
they would never get the second opinion they wanted.  (R. 2278-79, 2532, 2535-39.) 
 The next day, Cunningham went back to the Jensens’ home to execute the warrant, 
recording in her activity log that it was apparent that the Jensens had not returned home.  
(R. 3720.)  Eisenman faxed a letter to the Burzynski Clinic prohibiting it from seeing 
Parker, and requesting that she be contacted immediately if the Jensens came there.  (R. 
2014-15, 2891-92, 3732.)  On August 13, she made another report to Officer Peterson, 
who opened up a new case file.  (R. 3658-61)  She also arranged for a meeting with the 
Salt Lake County District Attorney’s office.  (R. 0515 (Ex. 33d, p. 12), 1946, 2904-05.) 
 Later that day, an unscheduled conference call took place with the juvenile court 
in which the August 20 evidentiary hearing was changed to a status/review hearing.  (R. 
0515 (Ex. 33d, pp. 12, 14).)  During that call, Eisenman misrepresented that the Jensens 
“have not responded to phone calls left on their cell phone or home phone” (R. 0515 (Ex. 
33d, p. 3)), when no such messages had been left.  (R. 2545-47.) 
 Eisenman subsequently realized that no order had ever been entered on the July 28 
hearing.  (R. 2026.)  (The minutes of the hearing had not been filed until August 11 (R. 
3735-36).)  Someone arranged for an order to be signed on August 15, 2003.  (R. 3702-
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 04.)  That same day, the meeting Eisenman had arranged was held with Deputy D.A. 
Angela Micklos.  (R. 2919, 3744.)  Based upon a (mis)representation by Eisenman that 
the Jensens had fled the state after the August 8 order transferring custody was issued, 
Micklos elevated the charges to felony child kidnapping. (R 2928-29.)8  Warrants on the 
felony charges were activated nationwide, and extradition was initiated.  (R. 2917-18, 
2923-25, 3683, 3764-73, 3777, 3781.) 
 Eisenman knew that the Jensens had not fled the state after issuance of the custody 
order.  Among other things, she had Cunningham’s logs (R. 1961), which said the 
Jensens had not been home all day when Cunningham arrived with the warrant.  It also 
seems inherently improbable that two people fleeing the state would haul their boat with 
them and their other children, who could have remained at home with Barbara’s brother. 
 While still in Idaho, Barbara Jensen let Parker drive her Suburban down her 
parents’ driveway to get the mail.  He had an accident, and neighbors called the police.  
(R. 2280-83.)  Daren Jensen was arrested on the child kidnapping warrant, and spent four 
days in jail until his father-in-law was able to post $5,000 bail.  (R. 2569.) 
 Barbara left for Houston with Parker, another son, and her mother.  (R. 2318, 
2320.)  Upon arrival, however, she received a message from the Clinic:  Based upon 
Eisenman’s letter, don’t come here.  (R. 2206-07.)  Barbara and Parker could not return 
                                                 
8 Eisenman does not admit making the statement, but the only persons at the meeting 
with knowledge of the Jensens were Eisenman, Cunningham, and the GAL, and it was 
not the latter two.  (R. 1946-48, 2905-08.)  Around this same time, an assistant A.G. 
made the same statement to Attorney General Mark Shurtleff; Eisenman was the only 
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 home; news reports flashed their photographs repeatedly and said they were the subject 
of a manhunt.  (R. 2323-24.) 
 The August 20, 2003, review hearing proceeded without the Jensens.  At the 
hearing, Eisenman made several factual misrepresentations, including: 
• “to this date I have never received anything from Dr. Birkmayer other than a 
letter,” when she had received three letters, and had told the Jensens they could 
not use Birkmayer; 
 
• “From Dr. Simone I have never received anything other than a letter,” failing 
to disclose her knowledge of a telephone call on July 30 from Simone to 
PCMC in which Simone stated a belief that he could convince the Jensens to 
have appropriate treatment for Parker.  (R. 3620); 
 
• “From the L.A. Children's Hospital I have received nothing except for the 
telephone information that I solicited from Dr. Tishler,” failing to disclose the 
August 4 e-mail she had received from Tishler; 
 
• “I'm going to state for the record that I did contact the Birkmayer Clinic to ask 
them what kind of treatment they had for Parker.  Mr. Mylar sent me a letter 
asking me not to contact them further and I never heard a response.”  (R. 0515 
(Ex. 33E, p. 22).)  That was untrue.  Mylar responded to all requests for 
information from Eisenman.  (R. 3508.) 
 
 The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 8-10, 2003.  (R. 3569-70.) 
 On August 22, 2003, defendant Cunningham issued a finding that the medical 
neglect allegations against the Jensens were substantiated.  (R. 1949-50, 3344-45.)  At 
that time, her records reflected total activity on the case of 3 hours and 46 minutes, of 
which one hour consisted of a meeting between Parker and the GAL (not Cunningham).  
(R. 1919, 1921.)  Cunningham later went back and padded her logs with nine more hours, 
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AAG on the case, and she met with Shurtleff at about that time.  (R. 2039, 3042-43, 
3053-55.) 
 including non-existent activities (e.g., recording time for a hearing that she did not 
attend).  (R. 1915-1920, 1945.) 
 In September 2003, Eisenman left for a new job.  (R. 2028-29.)  At that time, she 
made a number of factual misrepresentations and omissions to her supervisor, including: 
• Failing to disclose that DCFS/Cunningham had not investigated the 
reporting doctor’s allegations, which he would have recognized as 
improper. 
 
• Failing to disclose that the Jensens had asked for genetic testing and been 
refused. 
 
• Misrepresenting that the Jensens had fled the state after the warrants were 
issued. 
 
• Misrepresenting that the Jensens had chosen not to use Dr. Birkmayer. 
• Misrepresenting that the Jensens had declined a second opinion from 
Harvard because their insurance would not pay for it. 
 
(R. 3038-39, 3042-43, 3045-49, 3053-55.) 
 At the request of the Utah governor’s office, DCFS director Richard Anderson 
flew to Idaho and met with Daren Jensen.  (R. 1570-71, 2579-80, 3813-14.)  Anderson 
told the Jensens that he would be running the case from then on.  (R. 2583-84.) 
 Anderson relied in part on a factual timeline provided by Eisenman (R. 1551, 
1972-73, 3813-14), which contained numerous misrepresentations and omissions.  For 
example, Eisenman omitted the key fact that the Jensens were questioning the diagnosis, 
and instead represented that the Jensens were simply rejecting chemotherapy as a 
treatment.  Eisenman’s timeline also: 
• Falsely indicated that the Jensens were pursuing IPT as of July 10, when she 
had been informed by the Jensens’ attorney a week earlier that the Jensens 
were not committed to IPT.  (R. 3509, 3515-16.) 
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• Misrepresented that a second opinion was not obtained from Harvard because 
the Jensens “declined to pay the consultation fee.”  (R. 2370-71, 2639.) 
 
• Misrepresented that the LDS Hospital doctor had performed “a PET scan and 
other tests,” when he had performed no tests at all (R. 3076), and that 
Eisenman had no records of this consultation, when the Jensens’ attorney had 
given her a copy of a letter from him.  (R. 3509.) 
 
• Misrepresented that Wagner did not contact DCFS until after the June 9 
meeting, when DCFS’s own records showed contact on June 2. 
 
• Misrepresented that the Jensens had canceled the Friday meeting, when it was 
Wagner who canceled. 
 
• Misrepresented that PCMC oncologists did not know that a second excision 
was going to be performed on Parker’s tissue, when Wagner was informed of it 
ahead of time, and the procedure itself was cleared with Dr. Muntz at PCMC. 
 
• Misrepresented that the Jensens voluntarily chose not to use Dr. Birkmayer, 
when she had told them they could not use Birkmayer. 
 
• Omitted the key fact that the Jensens were not required to begin treatment until 
CHLA completed genetic testing, the results of which had not been received by 
August 8 (which Eisenman knew, having received the most recent 
communication from Tishler on August 4, which did not mention any results); 
 
• Implied that it was the police, rather than she, who contacted the District 
Attorney’s office to pursue criminal charges. 
 
 At the meeting in Idaho, Anderson was impressed by the extent of the Jensens’ 
research.  (R. 1568, 1572, 1616, 3813-14.)  He told Daren, “I understand you’re a great 
parent.  I can see that, but we can’t let you go.  We can’t have it over.  It’s gone too far.”  
He later reiterated to Barbara and Daren that he could tell they weren’t neglectful parents, 
but that things had gone too far and he couldn’t let them go.  (R. 2293, 2581-82, 2585.) 
 Anderson concluded that the events to date were consistent with DCFS policy, 
because Cunningham had been told that Parker could die in “five days” if chemotherapy 
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 did not begin, which triggered “emergency” procedures.  (R. 1552-53, 1596, 1610-1611, 
1681-82.)  But for that representation, Anderson says, the Jensens would have received a 
“thorough pre-removal investigation,” including a meeting with the caseworker to discuss 
concerns and options.  (R. 1556-58, 1614-15, 1671.) 
 However, there is evidence that DCFS’s custom and/or policy was not to 
investigate medical neglect reports made by a PCMC doctor. (R. 1676-77.)  Thus, for 
example, DCFS usually obtained second opinions from PCMC on reports from outside 
doctors, but the reverse was not true.  (R. 2031-33, 2831-32, 2836; see also p. 12-13, 
supra.) Furthermore, even under DCFS’s emergency provisions, Cunningham was still 
required to, and did not, “meet with the parents, attempt to negotiate voluntary 
compliance with medical treatment pending or in lieu of court involvement, and assess 
and document the parents’ reasons for refusal to treat.”  (R. 3431.) 
 Defendant Anderson had the authority to (and eventually did) authorize the 
dismissal of DCFS’s medical neglect allegations against the Jensens.  (R. 1564, 3018-19.) 
However, he was unwilling to do so even if a licensed physician assumed care of Parker, 
because it was his position that, if there were conflicting opinions between a parent’s 
physician and a physician upon whom DCFS was relying, the parents could not make the 
choice; instead, DCFS would require them to go to court and have the court decide “the 
more credible or the best treatment that is going to happen from the recommendation of 
the State or the parents.”  (R. 1565-67, 1678.)  Anderson also refused to authorize a 
dismissal unless Parker was treated by a board-certified pediatric oncologist.  Although 
he says his hands were tied by prior court orders, he admits that he had the authority to 
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 eliminate that requirement, and eventually did.  (R. 1577-78.) 
At the August 29, 2003, meeting, Anderson “agreed . . . to go back and get the 
warrants lifted.”  (R. 1575, 1594.)  Barbara and Parker were then able to rejoin their 
family in Idaho.  Immediately after a September 3 hearing, however, new warrants were 
issued.  (Docket in Criminal Case, 09-03-03 entry.)  
By this time, the Jensens were struggling financially.  Daren had lost his job after 
the neglect proceedings began, and his health insurance had lapsed.  (R. 2587.)  Anderson 
initially said that the State would pay for additional testing, but only if the Jensens agreed 
to place Parker in foster care.  (R. 2587-88.) 
To meet Anderson’s requirement of a board-certified pediatric oncologist, the 
Jensens agreed to have a Boise physician, Dr. Johnston, perform an independent 
evaluation, including new testing.  (R. 0515 (Ex. 33h, p. 9).)  Anderson understood that, 
under this September 5, 2003, stipulation, Johnston was not to make recommendations 
until the testing was completed.  (R. 1586-87.)  Contrary to the stipulation, however, 
Johnston informed Anderson that he had told the Jensens at their first meeting that he had 
a “strong inclination” and there was “every indication” that he was going to recommend 
chemotherapy.  (R. 1588, 1598-99, 2473-74, 2669.) 
 At that first meeting, Dr. Johnston informed the Jensens that he had learned from 
CHLA that its genetic testing had been unable to document an 11;22 translocation.  (R. 
2474-75, 3090, 3303.)  (This was the first time anyone heard any results from CHLA.  
(R. 2473.))  Speculating that CHLA’s negative result resulted from degradation of the 
sample’s RNA, Johnston had the sample sent to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane 
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 for molecular testing using DNA.  (R. 3303.)  Johnston then called Anderson and said 
that he was going to call the Jensens in two days and recommend chemotherapy, even 
though the genetic testing was not back yet.  (R. 1601, 1604-06.)  Anderson did not 
disclose that communication to the Jensens or the juvenile court. 
 On September 26, 2003, Dr. Johnston announced, “I learned yesterday that the 
cytogenetics lab at Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane has confirmed a t(11;22) 
translocation in Parker’s tumor cells, confirming the diagnosis of Ewing’s sarcoma.”  (R. 
3807.)  Johnston admits that this statement was not true.  Sacred Heart reported “a” 
rearrangement involving the 22 chromosome, but could not confirm an 11;22 
translocation.  (R.2060, 2676-78, 2701-03, 3817-22.)  Rearrangements of the 22 
chromosome are not specific to Ewing’s.  (R. 2057-58, 2098-99, 3165-66, 3204-05.)9
 It was evident to Dr. Johnston that all of the pathologists prior to his involvement 
had been reluctant to call Parker’s condition Ewing’s.  (R. 1791-92, 2699; also 2696-
2701 (“suggestion” and “consistent with” indicate uncertainty).  Johnston’s pathologist 
was also hesitant because the immunohistochemical testing was equivocal.  Therefore, he 
and Johnston decided to defer to the original PCMC pathologist and call it Ewing’s.  (R. 
1600, 2214-15, 2235-37, 2476, 2560-61, 2719-21, 3303, 3572-73, 3576-77.) 
 The Jensens balked at Johnston’s actions.  Shortly afterward, defendant Anderson 
agreed to stop insisting on a board-certified pediatric oncologist, and allowed Parker to 
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9 Johnston says he does not know why he “misspoke,” but admits that he became 
“wrapped up in this whole situation to the point that it became a bit of an obsession.”  (R. 
2692.) 
 be treated by any licensed physician.  He approved a motion to voluntarily dismiss the 
DCFS petition.  (R. 1587-91.) 
 Criminal charges in Utah were still pending, on which the Jensens had been 
booked and released in September.  (R. 3760, 3784.)  The child kidnapping charges 
carried a mandatory minimum sentence higher than that for first-degree murder, and 
going to trial would have cost the Jensens thousands of dollars.  (R. 3022-23, 3025.)  In 
exchange for a dismissal of the first-degree felony charges, the Jensens were required to 
enter into a plea in abeyance on the misdemeanor custodial interference charges.  (R. 
3778-79, 3823-24.)  The Jensens had to admit to factual elements necessary to support 
the prima facie elements of the misdemeanor offense, but were not required to disclaim 
the existence of defenses that could have been asserted at trial.  (R. 2926-27.)  The 
Jensens’ pleas were not to be entered as a conviction.  They would be held for 12 months, 
at the end of which they would be withdrawn, replaced with not-guilty pleas, and the case 
would be dismissed.  (R. 2926-27, 3021-22.) 
 On October 31, 2003, the GAL forwarded an e-mail to Eisenman from Dr. 
Johnston in which Johnston said that he “spoke to Dr. Moore, who is taking care of 
Parker now. She actually sounds pretty reasonable.”  (R. 3413.)  In November 2003, the 
Jensens had a margin performed on Parker.  (R. 2114-15, 2216.)  A Stanford University 
pathologist examined the tissue removed and reported no sign of cancer.  (R. 2942-43.) 
 The Jensens took Parker to see Dr. Moore regularly, but eventually stopped 
because Moore said there was nothing to treat.  (R. 2252, 2941-43.)  Cunningham’s 
neglect finding was changed from supported to unsupported, but the Jensens are still in 
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 the DCFS system.  (R. 1679-80, 1916-17.)  Six years later, Parker is alive and well. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The trial court’s ruling that res judicata bars the Jensens’ state law claims is 
erroneous for several reasons.  The court first erred in deferring to the federal court’s 
interpretation of the federal constitution without undertaking any independent assessment 
of the Jensens’ state law claims or the record.  It is contrary to principles of state 
constitutional analysis to accept an interpretation of the federal constitution as the 
presumptive scope of state constitutional rights. 
 The court further erred in ruling that the Utah Constitution did not afford the 
Jensens any protections against the type of conduct reflected in the record.  The 
inalienable rights recognized and guaranteed by Article I, § 1, include the fundamental 
right to make decisions regarding one’s family, including health matters.  Interference 
with those rights is presumptively unconstitutional, unless a defendant can prove that his 
actions were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.  None of the types 
of alleged misconduct here (misrepresentation and omissions, forcing the Jensens to 
follow the recommendations of a state-preferred physician rather than the physician of 
their choice, reporting the Jensens to DCFS because they refused to start chemotherapy 
without reasonably requested diagnostic testing, and failing to investigate medical neglect 
allegations before making them) satisfies either criterion. 
 Similarly, precedent form this Court and sister courts, clear and longstanding 
statutory prohibitions, and the background and intent of the Framers contradict the trial 
court’s (implicit) ruling that the defendants’ actions were not violative of the substantive 
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 and procedural due process rights guaranteed in Article I, § 7. 
With respect to Article I, § 14 (search and seizure), a state actor’s making of material 
misrepresentations and omissions to a court and others to is inherently unreasonable.  The 
Framers of the Utah Constitution had endured harsh consequences from the use of 
falsehoods by government actors, lending even greater force to the protections afforded by 
this section.  In light of those same experiences, the Framers also would have intended the 
protections of Section 14 to extend to both custodial and non-custodial seizures. 
Although its incorrect interpretation of the state constitution requires reversal in itself, 
the trial court’s ruling is also erroneous because the defendants did not establish as a matter 
of law all of the elements of res judicata.  There was no “earlier proceeding,” the Jensens’ 
state claims and issues were not finally adjudicated on the merits, and the state claims and 
issues are distinct from those decided by the federal court.  Additionally, the policy 
considerations underlying res judicata are not present, reaffirmed by the federal court’s 
declination to rule on state claims because of the “important” issues raised. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONFERS BROADER 
PROTECTION THAN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
 
 As noted above, the trial court’s application of res judicata was based upon its 
conclusion that the Utah Constitution did not afford the Jensens any broader protections 
than the United States Constitution (as interpreted by Judge Stewart).  Because Judge 
Stewart ruled that the federal constitution did not protect the Jensens at all from the 
defendants’ actions, if this Court concludes that the Utah Constitution does afford such 
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 protections, by necessity its protections are broader than those of its federal counterpart. 
A. State constitutional analysis in general. 
In earlier days, disposition of state constitutional claims typically began with an 
analysis of federal law, followed by an assessment of whether any reason existed to stray 
from whatever federal courts had opined at the time.  This variation on the “lockstep” 
theory (in which state constitutions are presumed to have the same scope as their federal 
counterpart) was initially endorsed by this Court.  See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 
805-06 (Utah 1986) (recommending analytical process from State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 
233, 236-38 (Vt. 1985)); see also State v. Gunwall, 720 P.3d 808, 811-13 (Wash. 1986). 
 Over time, state courts began to recognize the inappropriateness of deferring the 
construction of their own state’s constitution to a court charged with construing a 
national constitution.  See, e.g., Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 16 (Tex. 1992) 
(“Our Texas Forbears surely never contemplated that the fundamental state charter, 
crafted after years of rugged experience on the frontier and molded after reflection on the 
constitutions of other states, would itself veer in meaning each time the United States 
Supreme Court issued a new decision”); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 
1988) (“choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may 
prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state’s citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts”). 
 A state court construing its own constitution “do[es] not share the strong 
limitations perceived by [the U. S. Supreme Court] in its ability to enforce constitutional 
protections aggressively.  Those limitations arise from the structure of our federal system, 
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 the Court’s role as final arbiter of at least the minimum scope of constitutional rights for a 
vastly diverse nation, and the Court’s lack of familiarity with local conditions.”  State v. 
Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 91 N.J. 338 (1982); see also John W. Shaw, “Principled 
Interpretations of State Constitutional Law–Why Don’t the Primacy States Practice What 
They Preach,” 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019, 1028 (1993) (primacy allows tailoring of state 
constitutional protections to the values of state residents, “rather than enforcing the 
lowest common denominator of broadly shared national values”). 
 Factors in state constitutional analysis include:  “legislative” history, structural and 
textual differences between the state and federal constitutions; whether the subject matter 
is of local interest; state history, traditions, and public attitudes; sister state law; and “the 
common law, our state’s particular . . . traditions, and the intent of our constitution’s 
drafters.”  West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994); Society of 
Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n. 6 (Utah 1993); Hunt, supra. 
 B. “Legislative” history and intent of the Framers generally. 
 Relatively little history is available regarding the Declaration of Rights in the 1895 
Utah Constitution.  Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 929 (“There was little 
discussion or controversy regarding any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights”).  
Those rights were so fundamental, so uncontroversial, that there was nothing to debate. 
 Convention delegates knew that noncompliance with Congress’s expectations 
would put a 40-year quest for statehood at risk.  “It is natural, under such circumstances, 
for men to proceed with caution.”  State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986, 990 (1898).  
Accordingly, the Framers borrowed heavily from the constitutions of other states that had 
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 been approved by Congress.  Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928 (particularly 
Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New York).10
 From that fact, the suggestion has been made that it is difficult to say that the 1895 
Constitution was written by Utahns for Utah.  See C. Albert Bowers, “Divining the 
Framers’ Intentions:  The Immunity Standard for Criminal Proceedings under the State 
Constitution,” 2000 UTAH L. REV. 135, 148 (summarizing contention).  That does an 
injustice to the Framers.  Rather than simply copying verbatim from a single constitution, 
delegates carefully selected and rejected portions of various documents as suited their 
intent.  See, e.g., 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 
(“Proceedings”) at 423 (1898) (B. H. Roberts, questioning adoption of Wyoming’s 
provision on female suffrage rather than that of Virginia, New York, Ohio, or Indiana); 
483 (John Murdock:  “I don’t wish to refer to what older states have done; they have 
done as they pleased, and I hope the people of Utah will do as their best judgment will 
dictate to them, and I am not afraid of innovation”); 776 (David Evans:  mentioning 
constitutions of Kentucky, North Dakota, Maine, Colorado, and California). 
 Utah’s Declaration of Rights is not identical to that in any of the other 44 state 
constitutions, copies of which had been provided to delegates.  Choosing from among 
different options reflects intent, just as a court’s choice of quotations from other cases is 
                                                 
10 See also John J. Flynn, “Federalism and Viable State Government–The History of 
Utah’s Constitution,” 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311 (Illinois, New York, Nevada, Washington, 
and Iowa); Paul Wake, Comment, “Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights, and Free 
Government: Do Utahns Remember How to Be Free?” 1996 UTAH L. REV. 661 
(Washington); Wallentine, supra (Nevada, Iowa, Illinois, New York and Washington). 
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 no less a statement of its own intent.  Moreover, some Framers expressed a view that 
Utah was unlike any other state, and that their goal was to be more progressive than other 
states.  See, e.g., id. at 433-34 (Andrew S. Anderson: urging delegates to “show to the 
world that Utah is in the advance march of progress and civilization, and in those life-
endearing principles of liberty and justice”); 545 (Andrew Kimball: “the people of Utah 
through their circumstances are different to any other people in the United States”). 
 At the time of the 1895 Convention, nearly 90 percent of Utah’s population, and 
three-quarters of Convention delegates, were members of the LDS Church.  Richard D. 
Poll, ed., UTAH’S HISTORY (Brigham Young University Press, 1978), p. 393; Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928.  It is thus appropriate to discuss the background and 
views of church members at the time of the convention.  See id. at 929 n. 31; P. Bobbit, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1984) at 9-11 (relevant history 
includes prevailing sentiment at time of adoption). 
 LDS Church founder Joseph Smith had expressed concern about weak federal 
constitutional protections: 
The only fault I find with the Constitution is, it is not broad enough to cover the 
whole ground. . . . Its sentiments are good, but it provides no means of enforcing 
them.  It has but this one fault.  Under its provision, a man or a people who are 
able to protect themselves can get along well enough; but those who have the 
misfortune to be weak or unpopular are left to the merciless rage of popular fury. 
 
Larry E. Dahl and Donald Q. Cannon, ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JOSEPH SMITH’S 
TEACHINGS, p. 144 (quoting Sabbath address, Nauvoo, 15 October 1843). 
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  When it came to basic human liberty, the Framers were unwilling to sacrifice their 
principles even at the cost of the great prize.  Including women’s suffrage in the state 
constitution would “dig a grave for statehood,” Representative B. H. Roberts warned.  1 
Proceedings at 425-28.  Such concerns could “go to the dogs,” delegates declared.  “[I]f 
Utah is to be immolated for standing by her principles, for enlarging the borders of 
liberty, let the sacrifice be made, let her be bound upon the altar, let the high priest of 
tyranny come forth and plunge the knife into her breast.  She cannot perish in a nobler 
cause than that of freedom and equal rights.”  Id. at 738 (Orson F. Whitney); id. at 499 
(Alma Eldredge) (“[D]o I want statehood at the sacrifice of honor?”). 
 The Framers of the state constitution did not see their months-long labor as 
makework, as it would be if construction of the federal Constitution were dispositive.  
They viewed and intended the state constitution to be the supreme, fundamental law of 
this state.  See id. at 434 (Samuel Thurman); 479-80 (Charles Varian); 502 (Eldredge); 
561 (Karl G. Maeser); 572 (Charles Crane); 737 (Whitney); State v. Norman, 16 Utah 
457, 52 P. 986, 987 (1898); State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 339 (1904).11
 Consistent with that intent, this Court has repeatedly stated that the federal 
constitution sets the floor, but not the ceiling, of constitutional protections for Utahns.  
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11 The assumption that the state constitution would provide the primary basis of 
protection for Utah residents is reinforced by the fact that, at the time of the Convention, 
none of the protections of the Bill of Rights had been applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The first to be applied (takings) was in 1897.  Chicago B. & 
O.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  First Amendment protections, for example, 
were not held applicable to the states until 1925, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 
(1925); the Fourth Amendment not until 1949. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 701; Society of Separationists, 
870 P.2d at 940; West, 872 P.2d at 1007 (“Above this floor, states may balance the need 
to redress injuries to reputation with guarantees of free expression in a distinct way, 
thereby accounting for the unique history, needs, and experiences of their residents”). 
 For these reasons, the lower court should have reviewed the Jensens’ state 
constitutional claims independently of their federal claims.  See West, 872 P.2d at 1007 
(adopting “primacy” approach in free speech claim under state constitution).  That is 
particularly true where the family and a state’s judicial process are matters of local 
interest.  In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850 (1890); Hunt, 450 A.2d at 366.  In any 
event, however, the trial court erred when it ruled that the Utah Constitution did not 
afford broader rights to the Jensens than the federal constitution. 
 There is evidence in the record from which a jury could find that the defendants 
(1) made material misrepresentations and omissions in order to remove Parker from his 
parents’ custody and force chemotherapy upon him; (2) refused to let the Jensens choose 
between conflicting recommendations of two licensed physicians (i.e., imposed a 
“comparative unfitness” standard) and reported the Jensens when they continued to 
request diagnostic testing that all witnesses concede was reasonable; (3) failed to 
investigate, by choice, custom, and/or policy, the medical neglect allegations, including 
corresponding failures to train and supervise.  See Statement of Facts, supra.12
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12 See, e.g., pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 (Wagner misrepresentations / omissions), 14, 
15, 25 (Cunningham), 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 (Eisenman), 22, 26 
(Albritton), 32-33 (imposition of comparative fitness standard by Anderson) 14 (same by 
  From the time of its ratification, this Court has held that the Utah Constitution “is 
not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally, and on broad, 
general lines, in order that it may accomplish the object of its establishment, and carry 
out the great principles of the government.”  North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. 
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896); Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 
2d 61, 395 P.2d 829, 830 (1964) (court must “give recognition in the highest possible 
degree to all of the rights assured by all of the Constitutional provisions”).  In this case, 
the nature of the misconduct, the state’s common law and legal precedent, the intent of 
the Framers, and the history and attitudes of the state, all compel a finding that these 
actions (if found by the jury) violated Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
  1. Article I, § 1 (right to enjoy and defend lives and liberty). 
 Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides:  “All men have the inherent and 
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and 
protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate 
freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” 
 This “inalienable rights” provision has appeared in each version of the state 
constitution, beginning with the 1849 Constitution of the State of Deseret (“In 
Republican Governments, all men should be born equally free and independent, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cunningham), 13, 14, 29, 31, 32 (Cunningham/Anderson’s failure and/or policy not to 
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 possess certain natural, essential, and inalienable rights; among which, are those of 
enjoying and defending their Life and Liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”). 
 There is no comparable provision in the U. S. Constitution.  See 1 Bernard 
Schwartz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 319, 762-65, 840; Bruce 
Kempkes, “The Natural Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution:  When the Law Sits Too 
Tight,” 42 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 605.)  The closest language is in the Fifth Amendment, 
which states, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . ,” but does not mention “inherent and inalienable” rights, or the right 
to “defend . . . lives and liberties” recognized in Article I, § 1. 
 The right to enjoy and defend lives and liberties as guaranteed by a state 
constitution “includes the right of privacy, the right to marital privacy and choice . . . 
[and] the right to protect one’s health.”  16A C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 737 
(citations omitted); see also Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-149 (Minn. 1988) 
(right to make decisions regarding one’s health recognized in state constitution has been 
rooted in the law “for centuries”); Sojourner v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services, 177 
N.J. 318, 828 A.2d 306, 330 (2003).  As articulated by this Court, Article I, § 1 
forbids the abridgment by the state of the privileges and immunities of all 
citizens.  Under its mandate no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law, and every person is entitled to the equal 
protection of the laws, and may acquire property, possess and protect it, as 
well as defend his life and liberty.  These are inherent and inalienable rights 
of citizens, and are constitutional guaranties. 
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investigate). 
  
Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904); see also Golding v. Schubach 
Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871, 875 (1937) (“The Constitution declares in Article 
I, § 1, men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights among 
which are the pursuing and obtaining of happiness, and safety, and property.”). 
“Liberty,” as encompassed within Section 1, is “a term of comprehensive scope.  It 
embraces not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint 
of person, but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights[.]”  Block, supra, 
at 24-25.  The right to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and as a corresponding 
and accompanying right, the right to privacy in his own home,” is a “just claim, God 
given, or innate as a human.”  State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 69 (1964).  In 
this case, each type of alleged misconduct (misrepresentations and omissions, imposition 
of a comparative fitness standard / refusal to permit reasonably requested testing, and 
failure to investigate medical neglect allegations) are protected by Section 1. 
a. Misrepresentations and omissions 
It has long been recognized that interference with fundamental rights by a state 
actor employing material misrepresentations or omissions is wrongful.  See, e.g., Meyer 
v. Board of County Commissioners of Harper County, 482 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 
2007); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 691-692 (10th Cir. 1990); Malik v. Arapahoe 
County Dep’t. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 1999); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 
F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004), and cases cited; see also Merchants’ Nat. Bank of 
Kansas City v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 P. 985 (1892) (person who signs a certificate of 
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 stock containing false information is liable; “[t]hese views are so fundamental, and so 
consonant with honesty and fair dealing, that they need no authority in their support”). 
This proposition is self-evident, because interference with fundamental rights can 
be justified only if a state actor proves that his actions were narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest.  See, e.g., Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 28, 35, 163 P.3d 
623.  There can never be a compelling need to intentionally or recklessly fabricate, omit, 
or distort evidence in order to take someone’s child and force potentially unneeded 
medical treatment on him, or to obtain warrants or other judicial orders, nor can such 
conduct be “narrowly tailored.”  See, e.g., P.J. ex rel Jensen v. State of Utah, et al., 2006 
WL 1702585 **10, 16, 19 (J. Cassell, 2006) (state actor may not “threaten the Jensens, 
refuse to perform confirmatory tests, or make false, incomplete, or misleading statements 
to Utah courts[.]”). 
b. Refusal to allow parents to choose between licensed 
physicians or to seek reasonably requested testing. 
 
Section 1 is implicated when a subject is prevented from exercising the rights 
guaranteed by it.  See, e.g., Golding, 70 P.2d at 875 (Section 1 rights “are invaded when 
one is not at liberty to contract with others respecting the use to which he may subject his 
property (or use or employ his time or talents), or the manner in which he may enjoy it”). 
As noted above, the rights guaranteed by Section 1 include the right to make 
decisions regarding personal health or, in this case, to make decisions for one’s child.  
Defendants Anderson and Cunningham interfered with these rights by requiring the 
Jensens to follow the recommendations of the reporting doctor, rather than a licensed 
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 physician of their own choice (who, incidentally, turned out to be right).  Not only is 
there no compelling state interest in forcing a parent to use a particular doctor, but the 
unconstitutionality of such interference is widely recognized.  (To avoid duplication, the 
discussion of comparative fitness at pp. 50-56, infra, is incorporated herein.)  Similarly, 
Wagner, interfered with the Jensens’ rights by refusing to perform reasonably requested 
diagnostic testing, and reporting the Jensens for medical neglect when they continued to 
insist on such testing before starting chemotherapy.13
c. Failure / refusal to investigate 
Finally, Cunningham’s (and Anderson’s) failure to investigate medical neglect 
allegations also violates Section 1.  With apologies for the double negative, there is no 
compelling state interest in not investigating allegations of parental neglect before 
curtailing a parent’s liberty by making such allegations.  Indeed, state statutes expressly 
required Cunningham to investigate – to at least ask the parents – even in a so-called 
emergency.  Choosing not to do so violated Section 1 on its face. 
  2. Article I, § 7 (due process) 
Article I, § 7 provides:  “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law.”  This due process clause, the wording of which is similar to 
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13 Whether Wagner felt that such testing was necessary is immaterial, as all witnesses in 
the case agree that it was a reasonable request by the parents.  The federal court (J. 
Cassell) held that a refusal by a state actor to perform confirmatory tests reasonably 
requested by a parent states a claim for violation of the right to familial association and 
procedural and substantive due process.  P.J. ex rel Jensen v. State of Utah, et al., 2006 
WL 1702585 **10, 16, 18-19, which would be particularly true if a jury found that 
Wagner did so in order to meet a timetable for a clinical trial. 
 that in the federal constitution, affords two types of constitutional protections.  First, it 
guarantees substantive due process rights, Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 
199, 204 (Utah 1984), including “the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain 
parental ties to his or her child[.]”  In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982); see also In the 
Matter of the Adoption of B.B.D., 1999 UT 70, ¶ 10, 984 P.2d 967. 
Interference with these rights is subject to strict scrutiny:  a governmental actor 
must establish the means utilized are “narrowly tailored” to achieve “a compelling state 
interest.”  Wells, 681 P.2d at 206-07; Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 28, 35.  See also Jones 
v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) (recognizing similar right of children in 
familial association). 
Section 7 also affords procedural rights, “notably, notice and opportunity to be 
heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, 
or property.”  Wells, 681 P.2d at 204 (citations omitted).  “The general test for the 
validity of such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness.”  Id. 
 Although this Court has construed the state and federal due process clauses as 
substantially the same in some contexts, see, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 11, 52 
P.3d 1158, that “does not indicate that this court moves in ‘lockstep with the United 
States Supreme Court’s due process analysis or foreclose our ability to decide in the 
future that our state constitutional provisions afford more rights than the federal 
Constitution.”  Id.  Indeed, at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, the Court observed 
that the two due process clauses are not co-extensive: 
The constitution of the United States cannot, as to the states, be held to be 
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 the sole unbending rule as to the method of procedure, when dealing with 
the life, liberty, and property of individuals in the several states.  Such a 
rule would deprive the states of their right to regulate its procedure, laws, 
and rules of practice in their own courts, so as to protect life, liberty, and 
property by such due process of law as should be enacted with reference to 
the constitution of the United States which was framed for an undefined 
and expanding future, and for people gathered, and to be gathered, from 
many nations and many tongues. 
 
In re McKee, 19 Utah 231, 57 P. 23, 26-27 (1899); State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935, 2008 
UT 83, ¶ 24 (“While the text of the two provisions is identical, we do not presume that 
federal court interpretations of federal Constitutional provisions control the meaning of 
identical provisions in the Utah Constitution. In fact, we have not hesitated to interpret 
the provisions of the Utah Constitution to provide more expansive protections than 
similar federal provisions where appropriate.”)(internal citations omitted). 
a. Misrepresentations and omissions. 
 The making of misrepresentations and omissions by a state actor is a violation of 
both forms of due process.  As this Court recognized in Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 
690 (Utah 1981), “[I]t is an accepted premise in American jurisprudence that any 
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and 
totally incompatible with ‘rudimentary demands of justice.’”  That principle applies 
equally to the use of such tactics to interfere with the parent-child relationship.  See also 
p. 46-47, supra.14
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14 It is for this reason that collateral estoppel cannot be based upon rulings tainted by 
fraud.  Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, 107 (1926); Kennedy v. Burbidge, 54 
Utah 497, 183 P. 325, 327-28 (1919) (conviction procured through “perjury, fraud, or 
other undue means” is “worthless” to show probable cause in malicious prosecution suit); 
 b. Refusal to allow the Jensens to choose their own physician 
or to conduct reasonably requested tests. 
 
 As noted above, defendant Anderson admits taking the position that, if a parent’s 
licensed physician had a different medical opinion than a licensed physician consulted by 
the State, the parent did not get to choose.  Defendant Cunningham admits this also, in a 
different way:  She admits that she did not consider allowing the Jensens to rely on Dr. 
Moore’s recommendations because the person accusing the Jensens of medical neglect 
told her that Dr. Moore was not qualified to care for Parker.  By disqualifying a physician 
solely on the say-so of a reporting doctor, Cunningham de facto imposed her choice of 
physicians on the Jensens. 
 Particularly when viewed in light of the common law, this Court’s precedent, the 
history of the state and the intent of Convention delegates, these admitted actions of 
Anderson and Cunningham plainly violated the Jensens’ state constitutional rights.  
Under the common law, no relationship was afforded greater protection than that of 
parent and child.  A right that has “strong roots in the common law” suggests greater 
protection under the state constitution.  West, 872 P.2d at 1013; see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 62A-4a-201(1) (2003) (“The right of a fit, competent parent to raise his child has long 
been protected by the laws and Constitution of this state and of the United States.”); 
American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 43, 48 (the 
Framers intended that the common law be employed to interpret the state constitution); 
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see also Pierce, supra, 359 F.3d at 1292 (prohibition against misrepresentations is known 
and obvious). 
 Deseret Irr. Co. v. McIntyre, 16 Utah 398, 52 P. 628, 629 (1898) (same). 
 Unlike any other state in the West, “Utah was settled primarily by two-parent 
families . . . .”  Carrie Hillyard, “The History of Suffrage and Equal Rights Provisions in 
State Constitutions,” 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 122 (1996).  At the time of the constitution, 
Utah recognized a presumption that a parent will fulfill his duties 
by reason of the love and affection he holds for his offspring and out of 
regard for the child’s future welfare. . . . Indeed, the common law based the 
right of the father to have custody and dominion over the person of his child 
upon the ground that he might better discharge the duty he owed the child and 
the state in respect to the care, nurture, and education of the child. Before the 
state can be substituted to the right of the parent it must affirmatively be made 
to appear that the parent has forfeited his natural and legal right to the custody 
and control of the child by reason of his failure, inability, neglect, or 
incompetency to discharge the duty and thus to enjoy the right. 
 
Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907); see also 2 Proceedings at 450 (Richards:  “In 
the brute world we find the mother’s love for offspring more strong than the instinct for 
self preservation.  This is an unfailing passion throughout the whole course of organic 
life, whether brute or human”). 
 Prior to ratification of the constitution, a child could be removed from the home in 
Utah only upon a showing of his parent’s “habitual intemperance, and vicious and brutal 
conduct, or from vicious, brutal and criminal conduct towards said minor child.”  Laws 
1851 to 1870, Chapter XVII, § 9.  This standard was re-enacted by the first state 
legislature, Rev. Stat. 1898, Title 3, § 82, indicating that it was consistent with the 
Framers’ intent.  P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah 1988) (noting that many of the first legislators were convention delegates); Salt 
Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 526 (1908) (reenactment of statute 
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 is evidence that framers intended the law to remain as it was). 
 In Washington, to which the Framers looked when drafting the 1895 Constitution, 
the supreme court had reaffirmed a year earlier the principle that a child can be removed 
from a home only if the parents are affirmatively unfit, not merely because the state 
would prefer they make different choices.  Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9 
Wash. 419, 37 P. 660, 661 (1894) (“courts must exercise great charity and forbearance 
for the opinions, methods, and practices of all different classes of society; and a case 
should be made out which is sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong to meet the 
condemnation of all decent and law-abiding people, without regard to religious belief or 
social standing, before a parent should be deprived of the comfort or custody of a child”). 
 Consistent with common law and statutory history, this Court held long ago that, 
to be constitutional, removal of a child from his parent’s custody requires an affirmative 
showing of unfitness.  Mill, 88 P. at 613; Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926) 
(“[T]he unfitness which deprives a parent of the right to the custody of the child must be 
positive and not merely comparative, or merely speculative”); In re B.R., et al., 2006 UT 
App 354, ¶ 87, 144 P.3d 231 (under Utah Constitution, “a parent is entitled to a showing 
of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect before his or her parent rights are 
terminated”), rev’d on other grounds, In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 171 P.3d 435. 
It is thus long settled that state actors cannot interfere with a parent’s choice 
between licensed medical practitioners merely because they think one physician is 
“better” than the other, or because there is a conflict in medical opinion between the two. 
 See, e.g., In the Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (1979) (The analysis of a 
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 parent’s rights to direct medical care “cannot be posed in terms of whether the parent has 
made a ‘right’ or a ‘wrong’ decision, for the present state of the practice of medicine, 
despite its vast advances, very seldom permits such definitive conclusions. . . . Rather, in 
our view, the court’s inquiry should be whether the parents, once having sought 
accredited medical assistance and having been made aware of the seriousness of their 
child’s affliction and the possibility of cure if a certain mode of treatment is undertaken, 
have provided for their child a treatment which is recommended by their physician and 
which has not been totally rejected by all responsible medical authority.”); State v. 
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962) (parents rejecting for religious reasons unanimous 
medical opinion as to need for blood transfusions; “[h]ad there been a relevant and 
substantial difference of medical opinion about the efficacy of the proposed treatment or 
if there were substantial evidence that the treatment itself posed a significant danger to 
the infant’s life, a strong argument could be made in favor of appellants’ position”); In re 
CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. App. 1973) (clinic’s report of neglect for mother’s 
withdrawal of child as patient was baseless; “Whether the mother’s reasons for that 
dissatisfaction [with the clinic] were correct or incorrect is not the point.  The mother had 
a right to choose between different doctors or institutions for the purpose of this type of 
care.  So long as the mother was willing and intended to provide appropriate care in some 
manner, no finding can stand that she was guilty of neglecting the child”); In re Tony 
Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561, *3 (Pa. Q. 1912) (court could not substitute its medical 
judgment for that of parents absent showing of unfitness; even if defective judgment were 
a basis for superseding parents’ decision, neglect was not shown where “the science of 
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 medicine and surgery, notwithstanding its enormous advances, has not yet been able to 
insure an absolutely correct diagnosis in all cases, and still less an absolutely correct 
prognosis”).  Cf. Custody of a Minor, 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1064 (Mass. 1978) (“no 
dispute” as to diagnosis and need for chemotherapy; emphasizing that parent’s refusal 
“was not based on the parents’ view that another medically effective form of treatment 
could be found,” but merely upon ‘hope’ of child’s recovery). 
 Utah’s constitutional framers would have been especially concerned about this 
aspect of Anderson and Cunningham’s conduct.  For decades, LDS Church members had 
experienced what they viewed as persecution by a government intent on imposing its 
own values on the Mormon family structure, culminating in the famed polygamy 
prosecutions.  See State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 32, 996 P.2d 546 (mentioning 
prosecutions in construing Section 7). 
“[M]any of Utah’s constitutional convention delegates had either been pursued 
by federal authorities or were well acquainted with people who had.  Because 
of widespread newspaper coverage, the vast majority of Utah’s population was 
aware of the prosecutions, and the delegates to the constitutional convention 
had an intimate awareness of the problems posed by systematic oppression by 
the federal government. . . . Prior to becoming a state, the framers of the Utah 
Constitution suffered heavily at the hands of the federal government.  These 
memories were fresh in the minds of the framers . . . .” 
 
Bowers, supra, 2000 UTAH L. REV. at 151, 169. 
 The anti-polygamy campaign was directed at the disruption of families.  Fathers, 
mothers, and sometimes children were imprisoned.  Children were left without support 
when their parents were jailed or forced into hiding.  Conditions were harsh for those 
targeted by the government.  See Martha S. Bradley, “‘Hide and Seek’: Children on the 
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 Underground,” 51 UTAH HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (1953), pp. 133-153. 
 In 1882, as such deprivations were on the rise, a new provision was added to the 
state’s draft constitution, declaring that “The blessings of free government can only be 
maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, 
and frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.”  This language was restated in the 
1887 version.  Significantly, when its inclusion was questioned in 1895, Heber Wells 
stated the committee’s view that it was needed in light of abuses “in the past.” 1 
Proceedings at 362. 
 That the Framers would have been repulsed by a state actor forcing a specific 
health care provider on a parent is further supported by the writings of the Hon. Thomas 
Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, considered “the foremost constitutional 
authority in the world, perhaps,” by the drafters.  1 Proceedings at 447 (Richards), 464 
(Roberts), II Proceedings at 1739 (Evans); American Bush, 2008 UT 40 at ¶¶ 13, 49 n.16, 
51. 
 In Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 128 (1878), Judge Cooley had 
concurred in ordering a new trial regarding a patient whose family had committed her to 
an insane asylum, stating:  “I cannot admit that because one is a practitioner of medicine, 
it is therefore proper or safe to suffer him to decide upon mental disease, and consign 
people to the asylum upon his judgment or certificate.”  If “differences of opinion among 
those who are called to give scientific evidence” exist, he wrote, it would be intolerable 
for the patient’s fate to hinge on whether “one physician rather than another happened to 
be called in as the adviser.”  Id. at 132. 
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  Cunningham and Anderson’s requirement that the Jensens follow the 
recommendations of Wagner (and, later, a board-certified pediatric oncologist in this 
country) instead of a licensed physician of their choosing thus violated Section 7 rights.  
Additionally, as discussed above, the Jensens had a right to request reasonable diagnostic 
testing, regardless of whether Dr. Wagner felt a need for it.  Accordingly, Wagner’s 
actions in reporting the Jensens to DCFS when they refused to commence chemotherapy 
without such testing violated their rights under Section 7. 
c. Failure to investigate 
 
 The third type of state action evidenced by the record, Cunningham’s failure to 
investigate medical neglect allegations (and Anderson’s policy or practice permitting it) 
also violated Section 7 rights.  These rights require that the subject of a judicial or 
administrative proceeding receive an opportunity to be heard “in a meaningful way.”  
Worthen v. Buckley, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996). 
 No argument is, or can be, made that the Jensens had any opportunity to be heard 
in the DCFS proceeding before DCFS accused the Jensens of medical neglect and sought 
custody of Parker.  Cunningham cannot claim that she did not know how to give the 
Jensens this opportunity.  Aside from common sense (pick up a phone), state statute 
spelled it out for her.  See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(1)(a) (2003) 
(requiring, inter alia,  a “thorough investigation,” UTAH ADMIN. R. 512-201-1 & -201-4 
(2003) (outlining required investigation).  If Wagner indeed told her that it was an 
emergency, then Cunningham knew she had to at least ask the parents for their side of the 
story before seeking to remove their son from their custody.  See p. 13-14, supra.  
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 Cunningham admits that none of this was done, by which the Jensens’ Section 7 rights 
were violated as a matter of law. 
  3. Article I, Section 14 (search and seizure) 
 Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution states:  “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation . . . .”  This right is “‘the right to be let alone–the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men’ that demands an 
independent and proper judicial determination.”  DeBooy, supra, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 32. 
 On several occasions, this Court has found the protections afforded by Section 14 
to be greater than those afforded by the similarly worded Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  See, e.g., id., ¶ 12; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990); see also Bowers, supra at 147 (“several unique facets of Utah’s history” suggest 
that state constitutional requirements for testimonial immunity do not mirror the federal). 
 “Mormon delegates likely viewed the territorial government–controlled by 
federally appointed non-Mormons–as oppressive.  They had experienced the attempted 
control and suppression of their religious beliefs and practices by the federal government, 
often operating through territorial officials. . . . Both groups of delegates could claim that 
some form of authority, be it federal or local, had denied them freedom of conscience, 
and both were acutely aware of the threat government power presented to that freedom.”  
Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 935. 
 The employment of falsehoods by government officials, as alleged here, would 
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 have been uniquely disturbing to Utah’s Framers.  From their perspective, LDS Church 
members had suffered extraordinary harm as the result of false testimony.  In 1838, for 
example, Missouri governor Lilburn Boggs issued the notorious “extermination” order 
expelling Mormons from the state three days after the execution of a false affidavit by 
Thomas B. Marsh and Orson Hyde that claimed, among other things, that Joseph Smith 
intended to conquer the United States.  Gary J. Bergera, “The Personal Cost of the 1838 
Mormon War in Missouri:  One Mormon’s Plea for Forgiveness,” MORMON HISTORICAL 
STUDIES (Spring 2003), p. 139.  A month later, Missouri officials used the affidavit as a 
basis to jail Smith for treason.  Id. 
 Seven years later, Smith was again pursued by government officials, this time in 
Illinois.  In reliance upon a promise of security by Governor Ford, Smith and other 
Mormon leaders voluntarily surrendered.  Instead, Smith and his brother Hyrum were 
allowed to be murdered in their jail cell in Nauvoo.   See Whitney, HISTORY OF UTAH, 
Vol. 1, pp. 228-30; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, HISTORY OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS (Deseret News: 1932), Vol. VII, p. 
172 (Smith was arrested through “false pretense”). 
 In 1857, William Drummond, an appointee to the territorial supreme court, falsely 
reported to the attorney general that Brigham Young had murdered territorial leaders, and 
that the Mormons had burned territorial records and committed treason.  See Andrew L. 
Neff, History of Utah (ed. Leland H. Creer, Salt Lake City: Deseret News, 1940), Vol. 1, 
pp. 448-51.  President Buchanan, with whom church leaders were already at strife, cited 
Drummond’s assertions as evidence that the Mormons were in rebellion, and dispatched 
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 the Army to Utah to replace Young as governor by force.  Id. 
 Young issued a proclamation decrying, again, deception by government officials:  
“For the last twenty five years we have trusted officials of the Government, from 
Constables and Justices to Judges, Governors, and Presidents, only to be scorned, held in 
derision, insulted and betrayed.”  Proclamation, August 5, 1857; id. (“We know these 
aspersions are false, but that avails us nothing”).  More than 30,000 Mormons evacuated 
northern Utah in anticipation of invading forces.  Hubert Howe Bancroft, HISTORY OF 
UTAH 1540-1886 (San Francisco, The History Company: 1889), p. 535. 
 In 1871, Brigham Young was indicted by territorial officials for an 1857 murder 
based upon the false affidavit of a man named William Hickman, who was “in collusion 
with the crusading officials to bring trouble upon his former brethren.”  Whitney, 
HISTORY OF UTAH, pp. 629-640.  Young was denied bail and spent four months under 
house arrest; two of his alleged co-conspirators spent six months in jail.  Bancroft, pp. 
663-64. 
 Apart from the Framers’ intent, there is a more basic reason why Section 14 
protected the Jensens from the defendants’ actions:  By its plain language, Section 14 
prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures, and the issuance of warrants not based 
upon oath or affirmation.  The use of material misrepresentations and omissions to 
effectuate a seizure is inherently unreasonable.  Similarly, obtaining a warrant or court 
order through false oath or affirmation cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 14. 
The federal court rejected the Jensens’ argument that non-custodial (non-physical) 
seizures are encompassed within the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, but 
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 there is no question that Section 14’s protections extend to such seizures.  Indeed, if there 
is one state where that would be true, it is Utah. 
A custodial seizure is, as the term suggests, a physical restraint of liberty.  Daren 
Jensen underwent a custodial seizure when he was arrested and incarcerated in Idaho in 
August 2003, and Barbara and Daren Jensen were both seized when they were booked 
and released in Utah in September 2003. 
A non-custodial seizure is one that results from state-imposed conditions that 
significantly, but not physically, restrict liberty.  See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 
278, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (a citizen may be subject to state 
imposed conditions that restrict liberty, including conditions of bail, mandatory court 
appearances, restrictions on freedom to travel, diminishment of employment prospects, 
reputational harm, and “the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense.”  See 
also id. at 307 (Justices Souter and Stevens concurring in Justice Ginsberg’s view of 
continuing seizure). 
The Framers unquestionably had such seizures in mind when they adopted Article 
I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.  Many members of the Church had been forced into 
hiding or to abandon their families during the 1880s, which was no less an infringement 
of their physical liberty than an arrest.  (LDS Church President John Taylor had died 
while in hiding in 1887, less than a decade before the constitution was adopted.)  The 
Framers were very aware that a deprivation of freedom by the government can take forms 
beyond physical restraint. 
In this case, the Jensens were unable to return to their home state without the 
 61
 threat of arrest and removal of their child.  They were unable to take their child for an 
evaluation in Houston, or to other physicians of their choosing.  They were subjected to 
mandatory court appearances.  They were ordered to give up their passports.  Daren 
Jensen lost his job, and was exposed to diminishment of other employment prospects, 
both because he was terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his 
time, finances, energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family’s rights.  The 
Jensens were held up to public ridicule and contempt, and subjected to media scrutiny. 
These facts rise to the level of a seizure under Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution.  See also Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 945 (2nd Cir. 1997) (post-
arraignment order prohibiting an arrestee from leaving the State of New York and 
requiring that he attend court appointments amounted to a “seizure” under Fourth 
Amendment); Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir.1999) (overruled on other 
grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir.2003)) (holding that a plaintiff 
had alleged Fourth Amendment seizure where, in addition to being summoned to appear 
and answer to charges, plaintiff was forced to sign personal recognizance bond, and was 
required to report regularly to pretrial services and obtain permission before leaving the 
state); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3rd Cir.1998) (finding seizure 
where plaintiff was required to post $10,000 bond, attend all court hearings, maintain 
weekly contact with pretrial services, and refrain from traveling outside New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania); Sassower v. City of White Plains, 992 F.Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y.1998). 
II. RES JUDICATA IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE JENSENS’ 
STATE CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL REASONS. 
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 Res judicata is an affirmative defense, and thus the defendants bore the burden of 
proving that each of the elements was present as a matter of law.  Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 
P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993).  Apart from the trial court’s error in concluding that the 
state constitution did not afford broader protections than the federal, addressed supra, the 
trial court’s application of res judicata was error for additional reasons. 
“[R]es judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.”  
Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, ¶ 15, 982 P.2d 65.  In their motions 
below, the defendants argued that the Jensens’ state claims were barred under both 
prongs.  In ruling that “res judicata” applied, the trial court did not identify a particular 
branch; accordingly, both are addressed. 
A. Claim preclusion does not apply. 
“In general terms, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent 
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously.” Brigham Young University v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678.  When a party seeks the 
application of claim preclusion based upon a prior federal judgment, Utah courts apply 
federal res judicata law.  See Massey v. Board of Trustees of Ogden Area Community 
Action Comm., 2004 UT App 27, ¶¶ 6-7, 86 P.3d 120. 
Under federal law, claim preclusion applies only if the party asserting the doctrine 
establishes three elements: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) 
identity of parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause of action in 
both suits.”  Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. (Utah) 2008).  One or more of those 
elements is not present in this case. 
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   1. There was no earlier action. 
Claim preclusion looks to the causes of action that were filed in an earlier 
proceeding.  Pelt, supra, at 1281; Oman, 2008 UT 70, ¶ 31.  Here, there was no “earlier 
proceeding.”  All of the claims were filed in the same lawsuit in the same court at the 
same time.  Defendants’ removal of the case to federal court did not convert this single 
case into two cases.  See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 
1998) (“this situation does not involve two separate lawsuits, one in state court and 
another in federal court. Rather, it involves one suit that originated in state court and that 
was removed to federal court.”); McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031 
(10th Cir. 2000) (“Res judicata does not speak to direct attacks in the same case, but 
rather has application in subsequent actions.”) 
2. There was no “final judgment on the merits” on the Jensens’ 
state law claims. 
 
Res judicata does not apply if a court dismissed prior claims for want of 
jurisdiction, or other grounds not going to the merits.  Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. 
232, 71 U.S. 232, 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866); Park Lake Res. Ltd Liab. Co. v. USDA, 378 F .3d 
1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2004); Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 73 P.3d 325, 2003 UT 
12, ¶ 36 (where a federal court dismisses a plaintiff’s state constitutional and common 
law claims without prejudice and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, neither 
claim or issue preclusion applies).  In this case, the federal court went out of its way not 
to rule on the Jensens’ state law claims, which it said included “important” state 
constitutional issues that should be decided by a state court. 
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 3. The Jensens’ state claims are separate and distinct from the 
claims ruled upon by the federal court. 
 
The appellees argued below that, because the Jensens rely on the same underlying 
facts to support their claims under the Utah Constitution as were relied upon in federal 
court, their state and federal claims must be identical, warranting the application of claim 
preclusion to the state claims.  However, the Jensens have demonstrated how and why the 
rights afforded in the Utah Constitution protected them from the alleged misconduct, 
which necessarily distinguishes the claims from those under the federal constitution (as 
construed by Judge Stewart, who found no protection under the latter).  See pp. 37-62, 
supra.  (Additionally, the federal court did not purport to address the Jensens’ state 
common law claims, which are inherently distinct from constitutional claims.) 
4. The policy justifications behind the doctrine of claim preclusion 
are not present in this case. 
 
“The fundamental policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata (or claim 
preclusion) are finality, judicial economy, preventing repetitive litigation and forum-
shopping, and ‘the interest in bringing litigation to an end.’” Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 
224 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2000).  These policies are not implicated in this case.  First, any 
policy related to finality is not implicated by the procedural stance of this case, because 
the Jensens’ state law claims have been pending since the inception of the case, and have 
never been ruled upon by any court. 
Nor is judicial economy at risk.  The Jensens do not seek to waste judicial 
resources; they ask only for their day in court on their state law claims.  No judicial 
energy was expended on the state law claims by the federal court, as the claims were not 
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 addressed.  As to the policy of preventing repetitive litigation and forum shopping, the 
Jensens have filed only one action in one court.  It was not the Jensens who removed this 
case to federal court (a tactic more akin to “forum shopping”), but the defendants.  
Finally, the policy related to “bringing litigation to an end” is inapplicable here, because 
the Jensens’ state law claims have been pending since the inception of this case, and were 
never considered by the federal court. 
B. Issue preclusion 
Defendants also argued below that the second prong of res judicata, issue 
preclusion, barred the Jensens’ state claims.  “Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage, 
issue preclusion, ‘means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been 
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the 
same parties in any future lawsuit.’” Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S.Ct. 783, 
127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994).  Again, however, this component of res judicata does not apply 
because there is no “future lawsuit”; it is the same case in which the claims were 
originally filed. 
The elements of issue preclusion would not be met in any event.  As noted earlier, 
federal res judicata law applies if a party is attempting to bind a state court to a federal 
court ruling.  Under Tenth Circuit law, a party arguing issue preclusion must establish 
four elements as a matter of law: 
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the 
action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the 
merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or 
in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against 
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
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 issue in the prior action. 
 
Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). 
1. The issues presented for review in this action are not identical to 
the issues decided by the federal court. 
 
The legal issues before this Court are different than the legal issues considered and 
applied in the federal court proceeding.  The federal court applied federal law of absolute 
immunity, qualified immunity, substantive and procedural due process under the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and malicious prosecution 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Here, this Court is 
applying state law, including Article I, Sections 1, 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, and 
the common law of this state applicable to intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
wrongful initiation of civil and criminal process. 
Furthermore, the factual issues that were considered by the federal court are not 
identical to the issues in the state claims.  Factual issues are necessarily measured by 
reference to legal standards.  In other words, without reference to a law or legal standard, 
it is impossible for a Court to determine whether a particular fact is material or not.  (For 
example, a statement might be material to a claim for defamation, while immaterial to a 
claim for breach of contract.)  When dealing with causes of action arising under a distinct 
legal theory and source of right, the factual issues implicated are likewise distinct. 
The trial court also should not defer to federal court rulings that would be 
impermissible in state court.  Under Utah law, for example, a party’s intent is generally 
regarded as an issue of fact.  See, e.g., Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 2000 UT 58, ¶ 17; 
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 see also IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 2008 UT 
73, ¶ 18 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted) (state court may not grant summary judgment “if 
the facts shown by the evidence on a summary judgment motion support more than one 
plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case . . . particularly if the 
issue turns on credibility or if the inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent.”). 
Thus, for example, the federal court’s findings that misrepresentations by 
defendants Wagner and Cunningham were not made “deliberately” (see, e.g., Exh. 3 at 
38, 40, 46, 52, 55) would be impermissible on summary judgment in state court.  (That 
finding also did not address the Jensens’ alternative argument that the misrepresentations 
were made recklessly.) 
Similarly, the federal court’s finding that one or more of the defendants acted 
“reasonably” as a matter of law (see, e.g., Exh. 3 at 38, 42) is inconsistent with Utah law, 
under which “questions of reasonableness necessarily pose questions of fact which 
should be reserved for jury resolution.”  Ilott v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, ¶ 
18, 12 P.3d 1011, citing Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 727-28 (Utah 1985). 
The federal court’s factual findings improperly resolved credibility issues in favor 
of the defendants, and construed evidence in favor of the moving party.  For example, the 
district court made a finding of fact that “Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully 
attempted to schedule a further meeting to discuss the situation” (Exh. 3 at 6), when both 
Dr. Corwin and Daren Jensen testified that they had scheduled a meeting, but that Dr. 
Wagner nixed it.  See p. 12, supra.  This finding is important because, not only does it 
imply that the Jensens were unwilling to have further discussions about PJ’s situation, but 
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 this meeting would have been an opportunity for the Jensens to explain their position to 
the DCFS liaison (who was operating under an erroneous assumption that Wagner had 
run all available confirmatory testing), and potentially for Dr. Moore to explain her 
questions about the diagnosis. 
Another example of the federal court construing evidence in a light most favorable 
to the defendants is observed in its acknowledgement that fresh tissue was available in 
Parker’s mouth for new testing, followed by:  “However, this would have required 
further surgery to obtain a sample.”  (Exh. 3 at 4).  This characterization reflects an effort 
to excuse Dr. Wagner’s unprecedented refusal to seek such testing, ignores Dr. 
Albritton’s testimony that removing the remaining tissue would have alleviated her 
concerns that the tumor might spread, exaggerates the minor outpatient procedure of 
snipping additional tissue, and downplays the alternative that might be avoided (45 
weeks of chemotherapy). See p. 8, supra.  The federal court’s ruling is replete with such 
defense-friendly characterizations, which would be improper in state court on summary 
judgment. 
2. The “prior action” was not “finally adjudicated on the merits.” 
 
As discussed above, there was no “prior action” but rather a single case, so this 
threshold element of issue preclusion fails.  Moreover, again there was no final 
adjudication on the merits, at least with respect to plaintiffs’ state law claims, because the 
federal court never reached those claims. 
3. Policy considerations militate against applying the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. 
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 The Tenth Circuit recognizes that in certain instances issue preclusion should not 
be applied, for example, where the application of issue preclusion “would ‘do[ ] nothing 
to vindicate two primary policies behind the doctrine, conserving judicial resources and 
protecting parties from ‘the expense and vexation’ of relitigating issues that another party 
previously has litigated and lost.’”  Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National 
Indian Gaming Com'n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1030 (10th Cir. 2003). 
In addition, this Court has recognized that “collateral estoppel can yield an unjust 
outcome if applied without reasonable consideration and due care.” Buckner v. Kennard, 
2004 UT 78, ¶ 15, 99 P.3d 842. Accordingly, courts “must carefully consider whether 
granting preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate. . . . Collateral estoppel ‘is not 
an inflexible, universally applicable principle[.] . . . Policy considerations may limit its 
use where . . . the underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors.’ ” Id. 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
Such policy considerations are present in this case.  The Utah Constitution is the 
“supreme law” of the state of Utah.  Under the primacy approach, this Court typically 
examines state constitutional issues first, and considers federal law of no more persuasive 
weight than case law from a sister state.  State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 2007 UT 49 
¶ 33; State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 15.  Deferring to a federal court is 
detrimental to, not consistent with, state policy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellants respectfully request the Court 
reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for trial. 
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